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ABSTRACT




Committee Chair: Dr. Rusty Tchernis
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the direct and indirect effects of tobacco
control policy on risky health behaviors. Among the direct effects of tobacco taxes, I study
cigarette and cigar use, while among the indirect effects, I study marijuana use and body
weight.
In chapter one of my dissertation, I estimate the effect of tobacco taxes on youth
cigarette, cigar, and marijuana use. Using data from the Youth Risk Behavioral Surveillance
System (1999-2017) and a difference-in-differences approach, I exploit the variation in state
cigarette and cigar tax over time to identify causal effects. I examine the cross-tax elasticities
of cigarette and cigar use and find that, while an increase in cigar tax leads to a decrease
in cigarette use, an increase in cigarette tax increases cigar use. I explain this asymmetry
in cross-tax elasticity through a third product, marijuana, the most smoked product among
youth. My findings imply that cigarettes and marijuana are substitutes, while cigars and
marijuana are complements. Future anti-tobacco policies must take into account the high
prevalence of marijuana and its role in tobacco use.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I use quasi-experimental linear and non-
linear methods to reconcile the conflicting experimental and observational literature on
smoking and body weight. I use the Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance System to study
the relationship between cigarette taxes, smoking, and body weight. My findings suggest
that specification choice and accounting for misreporting may be the missing links required
to reconcile the two strands of research.
In the third chapter, using data from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveys, I document
a diminishing marginal impact of cigarette tax rate on youth smoking using parametric and
semi-parametric methods.
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Chapter 1
Are Tobacco Taxes Effective in Reducing Youth Smoking?
1.1 Introduction
Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable deaths in the United States (Centers for
Disease Control (2014)). Most adult smokers start as teenagers and, once addicted, find it
hard to quit smoking (Centers for Disease Control (2014, 2012); Glied (2002); Chaloupka
and Warner (2000)). Thus, an effective intervention to reduce lifetime tobacco use is to
deter youth smoking (Friedson and Rees (2020); Auld (2005); Glied (2002, 2003)). To re-
duce the high rates of youth smoking, government policy in the 1990s focused on reducing
cigarette use rather than the full range of tobacco products such as large cigars, cigarillos,
and little cigars (hereafter cigars). It led to cigarettes being more strictly regulated than
cigars, even though they have similar adverse health effects (Reilly et al. (2018); Rosenberry
et al. (2018); Pickworth et al. (2017) ). Between 1999 and 2017, cigarette taxes increased
by over 300 percent, while cigar taxes increased modestly by 60 percent. During the same
period, cigarette use declined steeply, but cigar use remained prevalent and is currently more
common than cigarette use (Wang et al. (2019); Gentzke et al. (2019); Warren et al. (2014)).
Cigars are cost-effective (due to lower taxes), can be available in mild flavors, and can also
come without health warnings (Cullen et al. (2019); Delnevo et al. (2017)). Although an
extensive literature is available concerning the effects of cigarette tax on youth cigarette use,
very little is known about the effects of cigar tax on cigarette and cigar use, and substitution
from cigarettes to cigars. This study analyzes the effects of cigarette and cigar tax on youth
cigarette and cigar use. I find a paradox in the cross-tax elasticities of cigarette and cigar
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use, not yet discussed in the literature. I investigate the paradox and find that marijuana
use is one of the potential explanations.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of cigarette and cigar tax on cigarette and cigar
use among high-school youth. I match ten waves of data from the Youth Risk Behavioral
Surveillance System (YRBS) for the years 1999-2017 with state cigarette and cigar taxes.
Using a difference-in-differences approach, I employ a logit model for estimation. The iden-
tification of causal effects comes from within-state variation in cigarette and cigar taxes. I
begin by estimating the effect of cigarette and cigar tax on cigarette use. I find that an in-
crease in cigarette tax has a small effect in reducing cigarette use, and an increase in cigar tax
leads to a decrease in cigarette use. The cross-tax elasticity of cigarette use with cigar tax is
negative. This implies that cigarettes and cigars are complements. I then estimate the effect
of cigarette and cigar tax on cigar use. I find that cigar taxes do not affect cigar use, while
an increase in cigarette tax increases cigar use. A one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads
to a 0.10 percent increase in cigar use. The cross-tax elasticity of cigar use with cigarette tax
is positive. This implies that cigarettes and cigars are substitutes. The opposite signs of the
cross-tax elasticity of cigarettes and cigars present an interesting counter-intuitive finding.
I investigate several possible explanations for the opposite signs of cross-tax elasticity
and find that one of the explanations is through a third product, marijuana. My findings
suggest that an increase in cigarette tax increases marijuana use, similar to its effect on cigar
use, while an increase in cigar tax leads to a decrease in marijuana use, similar to its effect
on cigarettes. This implies that cigarettes and marijuana are substitutes, while cigars and
marijuana are complements. My findings signal that the relationship between tobacco taxes
and tobacco products is likely to be affected by marijuana use. Future policy for reducing
2
youth smoking should take into account its unintended effects on marijuana use, and the
interaction between marijuana and tobacco products.
This study makes a few additions to the literature on youth smoking. First, I estimate
the effect of cigar tax on cigarette use and find a paradox not yet discussed in the literature.
Second, I find that marijuana use can be a potential explanation for the paradox. Third,
I provide new evidence on the effect of cigar tax on marijuana use. I find that cigars and
marijuana are complements. Fourth, I provide evidence of substitution between cigarettes
and marijuana. The rest of the paper is as follows. After a discussion of literature in section
2, section 3 and 4 discuss the data and empirical methods used. Results are presented in
section 5, followed by the conclusions in section 6.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, I first present the literature on tobacco taxes and cigarette use. Following
that, I present the limited evidence on tobacco taxes, cigar use, and marijuana use.
Tobacco Taxes and Youth Cigarette Use
Cigarette use and cigarette taxes have received wide attention from researchers over the
last three decades. Most studies from early 1990s use cross-sectional data to find negative
own-price elasticity of cigarette use. The estimates from these studies are negative, large in
magnitude, and range from 1.16 to 2.4. A concern with most of the earlier studies is that
the estimates are correlational, and affected by unobserved factors that affect smoking or tax
policy. Studies that use more variation in tax changes to identify causal effects find much
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smaller price elasticities of cigarette use. DeCicca et al. (2002) use the National Education
Longitudinal Study (NELS 1988) to examine the impact of cigarette tax changes on the onset
of smoking among 8th grade students. Using state fixed effects, they find estimates much
smaller than reported in prior literature, suggesting that youth are insensitive to cigarette
tax changes. DeCicca et al. (2008a) further decompose cigarette use into initiation and
cessation, and find no evidence that cigarette taxes prevent inititation. Lillard et al. (2013)
estimate the effect of cigarette tax on youth initiation using the NELS, PSID, and TUS-CPS
data. The own-tax elasticities implied by their estimates range from -0.03 to -0.23, showing
that youth are price inelastic in their smoking initiation decisions.
Carpenter and Cook (2008) (hereafter CC), Hansen et al. (2017) (hereafter HSR)
and Anderson et al. (2020) (hereafter AMS) revisit this question using YRBS data. Using
YRBS 1991-2005 and two-way fixed effects model CC find that cigarette tax reduces smoking
participation and frequent smoking. Their elasticity estimates range from -0.23 and -0.56,
which is smaller than earlier estimates. HSR update this analysis by adding four (2007,
2009, 2011, 2013) more waves of YRBS in 2017 and additionally two (2015, 2017) more
waves of YRBS are added by HMS to the analysis by CC. Using a logit model with two-
way fixed effects HSR (2017) find that cigarette taxes reduce cigarette use for the whole
sample. Interestingly, when they restrict their sample to years 2007-2013, they do not find
a statistically significant relationship between cigarette tax and smoking. Additionally, they
report that including state-specific linear trends that control for time-varying factors across
states diminishes the effect of cigarette taxes for the whole sample. Their explanation is
that ”hardcore” young smokers drive the results for the 2007-2013 sample. AMS reiterate
the findings of HSR (2017) and suggest that recent cigarette hikes have lost any observable
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bite. Their explanation is that tax hikes have driven price-sensitive youth out of the market,
while price insensitive youth remain. While plausible, they are unable to test this potential
explanation directly.
Evidence from international literature also suggests small participation elasticities
of cigarette use. Sen and Wirjanto (2010) use panel data of 591 youths from Canada to
estimate participation elasticities. The elasticities range from -0.10 to -0.14, which suggests
that youth smoking is insensitive to price. Sen et al. (2010) exploit the time-series variation
available within and across Canadian provinces. In particular, they study the dramatic
(50%) reduction in cigarette excise taxes that occurred in February 1994 in most eastern
provinces in Canada as well as significant increases within most provinces between 1994 and
2006. Their results suggest participation elasticities from -0.1 to -0.3 for teens aged 15 to 19
years, which is close to recent estimates from the US.
While there is extensive research on the response of cigarette use to cigarette taxes,
little is known about the response of youth cigarette use to taxes on tobacco alternatives.
To my knowledge, there are no estimates of the cross-tax elasticity of cigarette use among
youth in the literature.
There are a few important points to learn from the literature about cigarette use.
First, cigarette use among youth is decreasing. Second, the own-tax elasticity of cigarette
use with cigarette tax is small and negative, suggesting that cigarette tax is not effective in
reducing cigarette use. Third, there is no evidence on the cross-tax elasticity of cigarette use
with cigar tax. This study makes the following contributions to the literature on cigarette
use. First, I estimate the effect of cigarette tax on cigarette use, controlling for cigar tax, and
the potential omitted variable bias. Second, I estimate the cross-tax elasticity of cigarette
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use with cigar tax. After analyzing cigarette use, I check for the possibility of substitution
from cigarettes to cigars. In the next section, I summarize the literature on cigar use.
Tobacco Taxes and Youth Cigar Use
Cigars have received little attention in smoking literature. Most studies are descriptive
and provide prevalence estimates. I present some descriptive statistics from research on cigar
use among youth below. Following that, I provide evidence from studies that analyze how
tobacco taxes affect cigar use.
Recent studies show an increasing prevalence of cigar use among youth over the
last two decades. Delnevo et al. (2005) provide prevalence statistics for cigar use between
2001 and 2004 using the New Jersey Youth Tobacco Survey. They find that cigarette use
declined by 29 percent between 2001 and 2004, while more students smoked cigars than
cigarettes. Though they suggest a possibility of substitution across tobacco products due
to the disproportional taxes on tobacco products, they are unable to test it. Elfassy et al.
(2015) use the seven waves of the New York City YRBS from 2001-2013 to report trends
in cigarettes, cigars, and ST use. They find that the prevalence of cigarettes has decreased
while the prevalence of cigars and ST has increased among youth over their sample period.
Cigars can be more appealing than cigarettes for reasons such as price-differences,
availability in different flavors, perception of safety, and for use with marijuana. King et al.
(2014) assess the prevalence and correlates of flavored-little-cigar and flavored-cigarette use
among U.S. middle and high school students in 2011. Using data from the 2011 National
Youth Tobacco Survey, they find that more than two-fifths of middle and high school smokers
report using flavored little cigars or flavored cigarettes. Delnevo et al. (2015), using the
6
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), finds that recent an increase in flavoured
cigar consumption and preference among youth and young adults. Some studies also try to
find an association between cigarette and cigar use. Leatherdale et al. (2011) examine the
prevalence of cigar, cigarillo, and little cigar use among Canadian youth in grades 9-12.
Their findings suggest that cigars are used by a substantial number of Canadian youth,
many of whom do not smoke cigarettes. Schuster et al. (2013) use longitudinal data to study
smoking patterns among adolescents. They find that cigar use is high among adolescent
cigarette smokers and is strongly associated with being male. The above studies provide
mixed evidence on whether cigarettes and cigars could be complements or substitutes.
Despite the increasing prevalence, only few studies examine how tobacco taxes/prices
affect cigar use. Ringel et al. (2005) used the 1999 and 2000 waves of the National Youth
Tobacco Survey to examine the effect of cigarette and cigar prices on cigars use. They use
market-level scanner price information on prices and find that a rise in price of cigars is
associated with a fall in cigars use. Additionally, they find that an increase in cigarette price
is associated with a decline in cigar use. Their reported own-price elasticity of cigar use
suggests that a one-percent increase in cigar price leads to a 0.34 percent decrease in cigar
use. The cross-price elasticity of cigar use with cigarette price is negative and suggests that a
one-percent increase in cigarette price leads 0.66 percent decrease in cigar use. Some studies
use market-level scanner data to find the price elasticity of cigar use. Gammon et al. (2016)
study the effect of cigarette and little cigar prices on little cigar sales using scanner data for
27 states and find that a one-percent increase in little cigar price 0.317 percent decrease in
little cigar sales. The cross-price elasticity of little cigar use with cigarette tax is positive
and suggests that a one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.273 percent increase in
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little cigar sales. The elasticity estimates are large in magnitude and correlational, possibly
due to the cross-sectional nature of the datasets. The above studies indicate that smokers
might be avoiding the higher cost of cigarettes by switching to cigars. Jawad et al. (2018)
conducts a meta-analysis and systematic review of price elasticities of non-cigarette tobacco
products. For high-income countries (Finland, Italy, Spain, Taiwan, and USA), they find
that the average own price elasticity of cigar use is between -0.9, which suggests that a
one-percent increase in cigar tax is associated with a 0.9 percent decrease in cigar use. The
estimates for cross-price elasticity are more sensitive and range from -1.2 to 1.1. There is no
clear evidence of complementarity or substitution between cigarettes and cigars.
The only study that provides causal estimates of the impact of cigarette and cigar
tax on cigars is by Hawkins et al. (2018). They use eight waves of state YRBS data from
1999-2013 to analyze the effect of cigarette and cigar tax on youth cigar use. They divide
their sample by sex and find that higher cigarette taxes are associated with an increase in
adolescent use of cigars, with a larger effect males. A 10 percent increase in cigarette taxes
is associated with males being 1.5 pp increase in cigar use. Additionally, they find that
cigar use is inelastic to cigar tax. Though they do not report the elasticity estimate, the
cross-tax elasticity of cigar use with cigarette tax from their study is positive for both males
and females. Their analysis of cigar use suggests that cigarettes and cigars are substitutes.
There are a few important points to learn from the literature on cigars. First, cigar
use among youth is increasing and higher than cigarette use. Second, the own-tax elasticity
of cigar use tax is small and negative. Third, while earlier studies suggest a negative cross-
price elasticity of cigars with cigarette tax, more reliable recent evidence shows a positive
cross-tax elasticity. This would suggest that cigars and cigarettes are substitutes. This study
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makes the following contributions to the literature on cigar use. First, I update the elasticity
estimates for cigar use by adding four waves of YRBS data to Hawkins et al. (2018). I
expand their sample by adding data from sixteen states. Additionally, they convert specific
cigarette excise tax ($ amount) to ad-valorem (% of the price), which leads to the possibility
of endogeneity as price changes might reflect demand (Gruber and Frakes (2006)). Second,
I estimate the effects of tobacco tax on cigar use controlling for factors that vary across
state and over time, and can lead to potential bias. Third, most studies do not address the
relationship between tobacco products and marijuana. I provide some evidence to suggest
that tobacco taxes and tobacco use might be related to marijuana use. In the next section,
I discuss some evidence on tobacco taxes and marijuana use.
Tobacco Taxes and Youth Marijuana Use
Some studies provide descriptive evidence of the link between tobacco and marijuana
use. In addition to being smoked on it’s own, marijuana can also be combined with cigars
for rolling blunts1. Studies show that marijuana can be used with both cigarettes and
cigars, and can thus lead to initiation into tobacco use. A study by Delnevo et al. (2011)
finds that adolescent and young adult smokers who use cigars may be engaging in blunting.
Using data from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, they find that young
people recognize blunts as a form of marijuana use but do not recognize it as cigars use.
This suggests that blunt use contributes to nicotine intake and we must recognize that
blunt smoking might be a potential form of tobacco initiation. Weinberger et al. (2020)
examined marijuana use and smoking initiation, persistence, and relapse over an year among
1Hollowing out some tobacco from a cigar and replacing it with marijuana.
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a nationally representative sample of US adults. Using longitudinal data from the Population
Assessment of Tobacco and Health Study, they find that marijuana use was associated with
increased cigarette use initiation, decreased smoking cessation, and increased smoking relapse
among adults in the United States.
To my knowledge, no papers have estimated the effect of cigar tax on marijuana
use, and only a few papers have estimated the relationship between cigarette taxes and
youth marijuana use. Farrelly et al. (1999) use data from the National Household Survey
on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) for the period 1990-1996 and find that higher cigarette taxes
are associated with decreases in the intensity of marijuana use among youth and may also
lead to reductions in the probability of using marijuana. They suggest a negative cross-
tax elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette tax. Anderson et al. (2020) use data from
the 1991-2017 YRBS to estimate the effect of cigarette tax on marijuana use. They use a
difference-in-differences approach to find that cigarette taxes have no effect on marijuana
use.
There are a few points to learn from the literature on marijuana use. First, mari-
juana use is high among youth, and it can be used with cigars as well as cigarettes. Second,
the evidence from Anderson et al. (2020) suggests that the elasticity of marijuana use with
cigarette tax is small and insignificant. Third, there are no available estimates of the cross-
tax elasticity of marijuana use with cigar tax. This study makes the following contributions
to the literature on marijuana use. First, I estimate the cross-tax elasticity of marijuana use
with cigar tax. Second, I estimate the cross-tax elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette
tax, controlling for cigar tax. It accounts for potential omitted variable bias.
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1.3 Data
This study uses data from the Youth Risk Behavioural Surveillance System (YRBS). The
YRBS is a group of repeated cross-sectional surveys conducted every odd year since 1991.
I use two YRBS datasets for this study, the National and State YRBS. Both datasets are
administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and include state and
national school-based surveys of 9th through 12th-grade students. The questionnaires are
related to student demographics and risky health behaviors, including tobacco and marijuana
use. The questions asked in both the surveys are in the same language, and the national
and state samples do not overlap2. All waves of the YRBS contain questions on cigarette
use, but questions on cigar use were added since the 1999 wave3. Thus, I use data from
1999-2017, which covers cigarette, cigar, and marijuana use.
I pool the National and State YRBS for my analysis. There are a few differences
between the National and State YRBS, which serve as a motivation to pool the two. First,
while the National YRBS covers all 50 states and DC, the State YRBS is conducted by 46
states. The states of DC, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington do not participate in the
State YRBS, and Connecticut does not include questions on cigar use. Pooling the two
datasets allows me to use all possible state tobacco tax changes for identification.
Second, the National YRBS has a smaller sample size per year as compared to the
State YRBS. After eliminating missing observations on cigarette use, cigar use, age, gender,
2CDC suggests that their sampling is unlikely to create an overlap in the State and National YRBS
primary sampling units. The National YRBS follows a three-stage sampling frame: primary sampling units
(PSU), schools within PSU’s, and classrooms within schools. The State YRBS follows a two-stage sampling
process: schools are selected with probability proportional to enrollment size, classrooms with the school are
selected. Schools, classes, and students who refuse to participate are not replaced.
3In 2013, e-cigarette use was added to the questionnaire.
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grade, and race, I have 96,147 observations from the National YRBS as compared to 771,228
observations from the State YRBS. The combined YRBS has 867,375 observations, which is
almost eight times larger than the National YRBS. Thus, pooling the two datasets leads to
a larger sample size and more precise estimates.
I use questions regarding the use of cigarettes, cigars, marijuana, as well as demo-
graphics from the YRBS questionnaire. Regarding cigarette use, the respondents are asked:
“During the past 30 days, on how many days did you smoke cigarettes?”
Following the CDC, I define a respondent as a current cigarette user if they reported
smoking cigarettes at least once in the past 30 days. Using the same information, I define
them as frequent cigarette user if they reported smoking at least 20 days of the past 30 days.
Regarding cigar use, the respondents are asked:
“During the past 30 days, on how many days did you smoke cigars, cigarillos, or
little cigars?”
I define a respondent as a current cigar user if they reported smoking cigars, cigarillos,
or little cigars at least once in the past 30 days. Additionally, I define a student as a
marijuana4 user if they reported using marijuana at least once in the last 30 days.
I match the pooled YRBS data to cigarette and cigar taxes in January of each survey
year. I obtain data on taxes from the CDC’s State Tobacco Tracking and Activity Evaluation
(STATE) system. My cigarette tax variable is the state excise tax rate on cigarettes. I
convert the nominal tax rate to 2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U). There is wide within and across state variability in the cigarette tax.
From 1999 to 2017, the average cigarette tax rose from $0.33 to $2.06 per pack of cigarettes.
4“During the past 30 days, how many times did you smoke marijuana?”
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New York experienced the sharpest rise in state excise tax, rising from $0.56 per pack in
1999 to $4.35 per pack in 2017. Between 1999-2017, Montana, and North Dakota did not
increase their cigarette tax5. Thus, my identification is based on tax changes in 47 states
and DC. Of the states that changed tax in my sample, 12 states changed taxes once, while
the rest changed tax at least twice. During the same period, the average cigar tax increased
from 20% to 32% of the wholesale cost.
I use individual and state-level covariates to account for factors that might be cor-
related with youth smoking, cigarette, or cigar taxes. The individual-level characteristics
include the respondents’ age in years, gender (male as the base category), and race (Non-
Hispanic white as the base category, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and other race). The
first state-level control is an indicator variable for comprehensive smoke-free air laws, equal
to one if smoking is banned at the workplace, restaurants, and bars, and zero otherwise.
This information comes from the CDC STATE system. Other state-level controls I use are
the presence of marijuana decriminalization laws, state per-capita personal income from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor
Studies.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. On
average, 15% of students are current cigarette smokers, 11% are cigar smokers, and 6% use
ST. Cigarette use declined from 32% in 1999 to 8% in 2017. Frequent smoking declined
substantially from 16% in 1999 to 2% in 2017. During the same period, cigar use declined
from 17% to 8%. Marijuana use has seen a modest decline from 23% in 1999 to 19% in 2017.
5Nebraska is sampled in my survey from 2003, but it increased its tax before 2003. Thus, it does not
provide any identifying variation.
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Between 1999 and 2017, cigarette taxes rose from $0.52 to $1.94, by almost 300%. During
the same period, cigar tax rose from 20% to 32% of the wholesale price, an increase of 60%.
Other relevant policy changes during 1999-2017 include increasing smoking restrictions in
public places and marijuana decriminalization. Currently, marijuana use is twice as prevalent
as cigars or cigarettes, and youth often use multiple tobacco products.
Table 1.2 shows the interaction between marijuana and tobacco products. There is a
high prevalence of multiple tobacco product use among marijuana users. On average, 47% of
marijuana users smoke cigarettes, and 35% use cigars. Cigarette use among marijuana users
declined from 72% in 1999 to 28% in 2017. Cigar use declined from 40% to 27%, and ST
use increased from 10% to 13%. The use of marijuana and cigars among cigarette smokers
is high. 61% of cigarette smokers use marijuana, and 46% use cigars. Compared to 1999,
the use of marijuana, cigars, and ST among cigarette smokers has increased. This provides
some descriptive evidence that there is widespread interaction between cigarettes, cigars,
and marijuana.
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics: YRBS 1999-2017
1999 2017 1999-2017
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Current Cigarette User 0.32 0.47 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.36
Frequent Cigarette User 0.16 0.36 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.24
Current Cigar User 0.17 0.37 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31
Current Marijuana Use 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.40
Current ST User 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24
Age 16.08 1.21 15.80 1.22 15.88 1.24
Female 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50
Grade 9 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45
Grade 10 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
Grade 11 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Grade 12 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40
White 0.61 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.50
Black 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35
Hispanic 0.09 0.29 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36
Other Race 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Cigarette Tax (2017 $) 0.52 0.37 1.94 0.95 1.58 1.00
Cigar Tax (Ad-valorem) 0.20 0.15 0.32 0.24 0.29 0.20
100% SFA 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.42 0.52 0.50
Marijuana Decriminalization law 0.18 0.38 0.64 0.48 0.37 0.48
State Unemployment Rate 4.81 0.93 4.58 0.80 6.24 1.85
Observations 37,218 138,499 867,375
Notes: Data used are from ten waves of the Youth Risk Behavioural Surveillance System (YRBS) for years
1999-2017. Cigars stands for Alternative Tobacco Product (Cigar, cigarillo, little cigar). ST stands for
Smokeless Tobacco (chewing tobacco, snuff, dissolvable). Current cigarette/cigars/ST users reported using
the product for more than one day in the past 30 days. Frequent cigarette smokers reported smoking
cigarettes more than 20 days in the past 30 days. Current marijuana users reported using marijuana more
than once in the past 30 days. 100% SFA stands for a ban on smoking in bars, restaurants, and workplaces.
Table 1.2 Summary Statistics - Tobacco and Marijuana Use
Marijuana User Non-User
1999 2017 Total 1999 2017 Total
Current Cigarette Use 0.72 0.28 0.47 0.20 0.03 0.07
Frequent Cigarette Use 0.43 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.02
Current Cigar Use 0.40 0.27 0.35 0.09 0.03 0.05
Current ST Use 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.03
Current Cigarette User Non-User
1999 2017 Total 1999 2017 Total
Current Marijuana Use 0.51 0.69 0.61 0.09 0.15 0.12
Frequent Cigarette Use 0.47 0.27 0.39 - - -
Current Cigar Use 0.40 0.54 0.46 0.05 0.03 0.04
Current ST Use 0.11 0.34 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.03
Notes: Data used are from ten waves of the Youth Risk Behavioural Surveillance System (YRBS). Cigar
stands for large cigar, cigarillo, little cigar. Current cigarette/cigars/ST users reported using the product
more than one day in the past 30 days. Frequent cigarette smokers reported smoking cigarettes for more




I use a generalized difference-in-differences approach to estimate the impact of cigarette and
cigar taxes on cigarette, cigar, and marijuana use. Specifically, I estimate the following
reduced form equation:
P (Yist = 1) = β1Cigarettetaxst + β2Cigartaxst +X
′γ + τt + σs (1.1)
where subscripts denote individual i living in state s in year t. I use three main dependent
variables for my analysis: current cigarette user, current cigar user, and current marijuana
user. Each of these variables is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent uses the
product, 0 otherwise. I use a logit model to estimate the above equation. The main variables
of interest are cigarette tax (2017 $) and cigar tax (%) in state s in year t.
The vector X contains individual-level and state-level controls. The individual-level
controls included are the respondents’ age, gender, and race. The state-level controls in-
clude clean air policies (Restrictions on indoor smoking), e-cigarette policies (Minimum age
purchase laws, presence of e-cigarette tax, indoor bans on e-cigarette use), marijuana de-
criminalization laws, and state economic conditions (state unemployment rate and per capita
personal income). The vectors τt and σs represent year and state fixed effects, respectively.
For all the models, standard errors are clustered at the state level in each regression.
Cigarette and cigar taxes vary across states and over time. I use state and year fixed
effects in my model. Using state fixed effects accounts for time-invariant unobservables that
vary across states. The use of year fixed effects accounts for unobservables that vary over
time but are common to all the states. After accounting for both state-specific time-invariant
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and year-specific effects, the identification comes from within-state variation in cigarette and
cigar tax. This type of DID is also referred to as a “two-way” fixed effects model (FE). For
the current analysis, I observe at least one cigar tax change in 36 states and at least one
cigarette tax change for 47 states and DC (Except Montana, Nebraska, and North Dakota).
1.5 Results
This section presents the results of my analysis. The main results are presented in tables 3,
4, and 5. Column 1 in both panels is the naive regression that does not include any covariates
other than the cigarette and cigar tax. Column 2 adds additional covariates, column 3 adds
state and year fixed effects, while column 4 adds both. The covariates not reported in the
tables are race, gender, age, smoke-free air restrictions, marijuana decriminalization laws,
state per capita personal income, and the state unemployment rate. I use logit regressions
and report marginal effects as well as elasticities for cigarette and cigar taxes.
Tobacco Taxes and Youth Cigarette Use
Table 1.3 presents the effect of cigarette and cigar taxes on cigarette use. I show the respon-
siveness of cigarette use to cigarette taxes in panel 1 and both cigarette and cigar taxes in
panel 2.
Panel 1 of Table 1.3 shows that cigarette tax has a small effect on cigarette use.
The first column indicates that a one-dollar increase in cigarette tax decreases cigarette
use by 4.5 percentage points (pp). The point estimate shows that the correlation between
cigarette taxes and cigarette use is large and statistically significant. The elasticity is -
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0.474, which implies that a one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.474 percent
decrease in cigarette use. Column 2 shows that, by contrast, cigarette taxes have a small
and positive effect on cigarette use when we include covariates. The effect is not statistically
significant. The addition of state and year fixed effects in column 3 reduces the magnitude of
the elasticity estimate to 0.095. The addition of covariates, and state and year fixed effects
in column 4 reduce the point estimate and elasticity further. It shows that a one-dollar
increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.8 pp decrease in cigarette use, implying an elasticity of
0.084. The elasticity in column 4 is five times lower than the naive estimate from column
1, and covariates/fixed effects absorb most of the correlation. The implication from panel 1
is that increasing cigarette tax has a small effect in reducing cigarette use. The addition of
cigar tax, in panel 2, reduces the own-tax elasticity of cigarette use and makes it statistically
insignificant.
Panel 2 of Table 1.3 adds cigar tax as an additional covariate to each of the specifi-
cations from panel 1. The first column indicates that a 100 pp increase in cigar tax leads to
a 1.5 pp decrease in cigarette use. Although the point estimate shows a negative correlation,
it is statistically insignificant. The cross-tax elasticity is -0.029, which implies that a one-
percent increase in cigar tax leads to a 0.029 percent decrease in cigarette use. Column 2
adds covariates to the naive specification and indicates an increase in size as well as precision
of the point estimate. Column 3, which adds state and year fixed effects to column 1, shows
that a 100 pp increase in cigar tax leads to a 2.8 pp decrease in cigarette use. The point
estimate is statistically significant and implies a negative cross-tax elasticity of 0.054. The
point estimate decreases slightly (0.027 compared to 0.028) in column 4 when I include co-
variates and fixed effects. The cross-tax elasticity is negative and statistically significant. It
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shows that a one-percent increase in cigar tax leads to a 0.052 percent decrease in cigarette
use. The negative cross-tax elasticity implies that cigarettes and cigars are complements.
The main results from panel 1 and panel 2 have two important implications. First, the
own-tax elasticity of cigarette use is small and negative, implying that further cigarette tax
increases might not be effective in reducing cigarette use. The findings that youth cigarette
use is price-inelastic is consistent with the recent literature (Anderson et al. (2020); Hansen
et al. (2017); Carpenter and Cook (2008); DeCicca et al. (2008b)). Second, I find that the
cross-tax elasticity of cigarette use with cigar tax is negative, implying that cigarettes and
cigars are complements.
Table 1.3 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Cigarette Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Cigarette Use
Panel 1
Cigarette Tax -0.045∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Elasticity [-0.474] [-0.126] [-0.095] [-0.084]
Panel 2
Cigarette Tax -0.043∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.006∗∗ -0.004
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Elasticity [-0.453] [0.053] [-0.063] [-0.042]
Cigar Tax -0.015 -0.106∗∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.043) (0.027) (0.015) (0.014)
Elasticity [-0.029] [-0.205] [-0.054] [-0.052]
Observations 867,375 867,375 867,375 867,375
Additional Covariates X X
State and Year Fixed Effects X X
Notes: The above table presents marginal effects from the logistic regression of cigarette use on cigarette/cigar
tax, using the YRBS 1999-2017. Panel (1) uses cigarette tax as the main variable of interest and panel (2)
uses both cigarette and cigar tax. Column (1) does not include individual and state-level covariates. Columns
(2), (3), (4) add state, year fixed effects, and additional covariates. Covariates not reported are race, gender,
age, marijuana decriminalization laws, smoke-free air restrictions, e-cigarette minimum age laws, e-cigarette
tax, state per capita personal income, and the state unemployment rate. The elasticities of cigarette use
with respect to cigarette/cigar tax are reported in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level and are reported in parentheses.
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Tobacco Taxes and Youth Cigar Use
Table 1.4 presents the effect of cigarette and cigar taxes on cigar use. I show the respon-
siveness of cigar use to cigar taxes in panel 1 and both cigar and cigarette taxes in panel
2.
In panel 1 of Table 1.4, the first column indicates that a 100 pp increase in cigar
tax decreases cigar use by 5.9 pp. The point estimate that shows the correlation between
cigar taxes and cigar use is large and statistically significant. The elasticity is -0.171, which
implies that a one-percent increase in cigar tax leads to a 0.171 percent decrease in cigar use.
Column 2 shows that the elasticity decreases to -0.128 when covariates are included. The
addition of state and year fixed effects in column 3 reduces the magnitude of the elasticity
estimate to 0.043 and reverses the sign. The addition of covariates and state and year fixed
effects in column 4 increases the point estimate and elasticity further. It shows that a 100 pp
increase in cigar tax leads to a 1.6 pp decrease in cigar use, implying an elasticity of 0.046.
The addition of cigarette tax as a covariate in panel 2 reduces the own-tax elasticity of
cigar tax to -0.0058. The own-tax elasticity is small, negative, and statistically insignificant,
implying that increasing cigar tax does not have a significant effect on cigar use.
Panel 2 of Table 1.4 adds cigarette tax as an additional covariate to each of the
specifications from panel 1. The first column indicates that a one-dollar increase in cigarette
tax leads to a 1.7 pp decrease in cigar use. The point estimate is statistically significant.
The cross-tax elasticity is -0.269, which implies that a one-percent increase in cigarette tax
leads to a 0.269 percent decrease in cigarette use. The point estimate changes sign and
reduces to 0.4 pp in column 2 when I add covariates. Column 3, which adds state and year
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fixed effects to column 1, shows that a one-dollar increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.7 pp
increase in cigar use. The point estimate is statistically significant and implies a cross-tax
elasticity of 0.11. The point estimate decreases in column 4 when I include covariates as well
as fixed effects. It implies that a one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.095 percent
increase in cigar use. The positive cross-tax elasticity of cigar use implies that cigarettes
and cigars as substitutes. This is in contrast to the cross-tax elasticity in the analysis of
cigarette use (Table 1.4), which showed that cigarettes and cigars are complements.
The main results have two important implications. First, the own-tax elasticity
of cigar use is small and negative, implying that cigar taxes are not effective in reducing
cigar use. My findings are consistent with the recent estimates on the own-tax elasticity
of cigar use by Hawkins et al. (2018). Second, the cross-tax elasticity of cigar use with
cigarette tax is positive, implying that cigarettes and cigars are substitutes. This is in
contrast to the previous table analyzing cigarette use, which implied that cigarettes and
cigars are complements. The asymmetric cross-tax elasticities of cigarettes and cigars present
an interesting paradox. In the next section, I show that the cross-tax elasticity of marijuana
use with cigarette and cigar tax drives the asymmetric cross-tax elasticities of cigarette and
cigar use.
Tobacco Taxes and Youth Marijuana Use
Table 1.5 presents the effect of cigarette and cigar tax on marijuana use. I show the re-
sponsiveness of marijuana use to cigarette taxes in panel 1, cigar taxes in panel 2, and both
cigarette and cigar taxes in panel 3.
Panel 1 of Table 1.5 shows that if we do not account for cigar tax, cigarette tax
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Table 1.4 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Cigar Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Cigar Use
Panel 1
Cigar Tax -0.059∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.015 0.016
(0.026) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Elasticity [-0.171] [-0.128] [0.043] [0.046]
Panel 2
Cigar Tax -0.014 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013)
Elasticity [-0.041] [-0.156] [-0.014] [-0.0058]
Cigarette Tax -0.017∗∗∗ 0.004 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Elasticity [-0.269] [0.063] [0.111] [0.095]
Observations 867,375 867,375 867,375 867,375
Additional Covariates X X
State and Year Fixed Effects X X
Notes: The above table presents marginal effects from the logistic regression of cigar use on cigar/cigarette
tax, using the YRBS 1999-2017. Panel (1) uses cigar tax as the main variable of interest and panel (2) uses
both cigar and cigarette tax. Column (1) does not include individual and state-level covariates. Columns
(2), (3), (4) add state, year fixed effects, and additional covariates. Covariates not reported are race, gender,
age, marijuana decriminalization laws, smoke-free air restrictions, e-cigarette minimum age laws, e-cigarette
tax, state per capita personal income, and the state unemployment rate. The elasticities of cigar use with
respect to cigar/cigarette tax are reported in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level and are reported in parentheses.
appears to have no effect on marijuana use. The first column indicates that a one-dollar
increase in cigarette tax has no effect on marijuana use. Column 2 shows that, by contrast,
cigarette taxes have a small positive effect on marijuana use when I include covariates. The
point estimate is not statistically significant and implies an elasticity of 0.058. The addition
of state and year fixed effects in column 3 reduces the magnitude of the elasticity estimate
to 0.033. The point estimate from column 4 shows that a one-dollar increase in cigarette tax
leads to a 0.4 pp increase in marijuana use. The effect is not statistically significant. The
implication from panel 1 is that marijuana use is not affected by cigarette taxes, which is
similar to the findings of Anderson et al. (2020).
Panel 2 of Table 1.5 shows that if we do not account for cigarette tax, cigar tax
appears to have no effect on marijuana use. The first column indicates that a 100 pp increase
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in cigar tax decreases marijuana use by 0.9 pp. The point estimate is small and statistically
insignificant. It implies that a one-percent increase in cigar tax leads to a 0.014 percent
decrease in marijuana use. The point estimate and elasticity remain small and statistically
insignificant in column 2 (Addition of covariates) and column 3 (Addition of state and year
fixed effects). The point estimate and elasticity reduce further with the addition of both
covariates and state and year fixed effects in column 4. It shows that a 100 pp increase in
cigar tax leads to a 0.4 pp decrease in marijuana use. The point estimate is statistically
insignificant. The implication from panel 2 is that cigar taxes do not affect marijuana use.
I test the validity of this result using both cigarette and cigar tax as covariates in panel 3.
In panel 3 of Table 1.5, the estimation equation consists of both cigarette and cigar
tax as covariates. The first column indicates that a one-dollar increase in cigarette tax leads
to a 0.2 pp increase in marijuana use. The point estimate is not statistically significant. The
effect increases in magnitude and precision with the addition of covariates or fixed effects
or both. Column 4 shows that a one-dollar increase in cigarette tax increases marijuana
use by 0.8 pp. The point estimate is statistically significant and implies that a one-percent
increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.06 percent increase in marijuana use. The positive cross-
tax elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette tax implies that marijuana and cigarettes are
substitutes. Notably, the cross-tax elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette tax is positive,
similar to the cross-tax elasticity of cigar use with cigarette tax.
Panel 3 also shows that cigar tax has a negative effect on marijuana use. The naive
estimate in column 1 indicates that a 100 pp increase in cigar tax leads to a 1.3 pp decrease
in marijuana use. The effect increases in magnitude and precision with the addition of
covariates or fixed effects. Column 4 shows that a 100 pp increase in cigar tax decreases
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marijuana use by 2.8 pp. The point estimate is statistically significant and implies that a
one-percent increase in cigar tax leads to a 0.047 percent decrease in marijuana use. The
negative cross-tax elasticity of marijuana use with cigar tax implies that marijuana and
cigars are complements.
The main results from the table show that cigarette and cigar taxes have opposite
effects on marijuana use. There are three important implications. First, the cross-tax
elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette tax is positive, which is the same sign as the
elasticity of cigar use with cigarette tax. Second, the elasticity of marijuana use with cigar
tax is negative, which is the same sign as the elasticity of cigarette use with cigar tax. The
cross-tax elasticities imply that marijuana and cigarettes are substitutes, while marijuana
and cigars are complements. Marijuana use drives the cross-tax elasticities of cigarette
and cigar use, providing a potential explanation for the asymmetric cross-tax elasticities of
cigarettes and cigars. If true, it would suggest that tobacco use has evolved into a form of
marijuana use. Failure to account for marijuana consumption in the estimation of cigarette
and cigar use will lead to omitted variable bias in the elasticity estimates of cigarette and
cigar use.
Sensitivity Analysis
I test for alternative factors that could explain the asymmetric sign of the cross-tax elasticity
of cigarette and cigar use.
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Table 1.5 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Marijuana Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Marijuana Use
Panel 1
Cigarette Tax 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Elasticity [0.00] [0.058] [0.033] [0.033]
Panel 2
Cigar Tax -0.009 -0.014 -0.008 -0.004
(0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019)
Elasticity [-0.014] [-0.021] [-0.012] [-0.0061]
Panel 3
Cigarette Tax 0.002 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Elasticity [0.017] [0.133] [0.075] [0.066]
Cigar Tax -0.013 -0.052∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.029) (0.012) (0.010)
Elasticity [-0.019] [-0.079] [-0.053] [-0.043]
Observations 867,375 867,375 867,375 867,375
Additional Covariates X X
State and Year Fixed Effects X X
Notes: The above table presents marginal effects from the logistic regression of marijuana use on
cigar/cigarette tax, using the YRBS 1999-2017. Panel (1) and (2) present results using the cigarette tax
and cigarette tax as the main variables of interest, respectively. Panel (3) uses both cigarette and cigar tax
as covariates. Column (1) does not include individual and state-level covariates. Columns (2), (3), (4) add
state, year fixed effects, and additional covariates. Covariates not reported are race, gender, age, marijuana
decriminalization laws, smoke-free air restrictions, e-cigarette minimum age laws, e-cigarette tax, state per
capita personal income, and the state unemployment rate. The elasticities of marijuana use with respect to
cigar/cigarette tax are reported in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are
reported in parentheses.
1.5.0.1 Controlling for Marijuana Legalization
Table 1.6 shows the elasticities of cigarette, cigar, and marijuana use with cigarette
and cigar tax, after controlling for recreational and medicinal marijuana legalization6. I use
legalization laws as a proxy for marijuana prices, as they drive up the black market price of
marijuana, making it more costly to supply illegally to minors (Anderson and Elsea (2015);
Anderson et al. (2019, 2020)). The cross-tax elasticity of cigarette use with cigar tax is
negative, though it is no longer statistically significant. The cross-tax elasticity of cigar
6Data on Marijuana Legalization provided by Smart and Pacula (2019)
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use is positive and significant, similar to the main specification in Table 1.4. The cross-tax
elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette and cigar tax is consistent with the main results.
The elasticity of marijuana use with cigarette tax is positive and significant, suggesting that
cigarettes and marijuana are substitutes. The elasticity of marijuana use with cigar tax is
negative, suggesting that marijuana and cigars are complements. Controlling for marijuana
legalization does not change the asymmetric signs of the cross-tax elasticities of cigarette,
cigar, and marijuana use.
Table 1.6 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Smoking: Controlling for MLL
(1) (2) (3)
Cigarette Cigar Marijuana
Cigarette Tax -0.002 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Elasticity [-0.021] [0.126] [0.075]
Cigar Tax -0.026 -0.002 -0.031∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.010)
Elasticity [-0.050] [-0.0058] [-0.047]
Observations 867,375 867,375 867,375
Notes: The above table presents marginal effects from the logistic regression of cigarette/cigar/marijuana
use on cigarette and cigar tax. All columns use state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and additional co-
variates. Covariates not reported are race, gender, age, marijuana decriminalization laws, smoke-free air
restrictions, state per capita personal income, state unemployment rate, e-cigarette minimum age laws,
dummy for e-cigarette tax, medicinal marijuana laws (MML), recreational marijuana laws (RML). The elas-
ticity is reported in square brackets. The standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in
parentheses.
1.5.0.2 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Smoking: YRBS 2007-2017
Table 1.7 shows results separately for the years 1999-2005 and 2007-2017. I find that cigarette
taxes have no significant effect in reducing cigarette use for the years 2007-2017, which is
consistent with recent studies (Anderson et al. (2020); Hansen et al. (2017)). For the years
2007-2017, the cross-tax elasticity of cigar use with cigarette tax for the later years is 18.
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That is, a one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to an 0.18 percent increase in cigar
use. Consistent with previous results, the effect of cigarette tax on marijuana use is similar
to its effects on cigar use. A one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to a 0.104 percent
increase in marijuana use. The results imply that switching to cigars and marijuana from
cigarettes for the full sample is driven by cigarette tax hikes during 2007-2017. The cross-tax
elasticity of cigarette and marijuana use is negative and statistically insignificant for both
sets of sample years. In sum, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that cigarette
taxes have lost their bite in reducing cigarette use (Anderson et al. (2020); Hansen et al.
(2017)). Additionally, rising cigarette taxes contribute to an increase in cigar and marijuana
use among youth.
Table 1.7 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Smoking: 1999-2005 vs. 2007-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1999-2005 2007-2017
Cigarette Cigar Marijuana Cigarette Cigar Marijuana
Cigarette Tax -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.009∗ 0.011∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Elasticity [-0.019] [-0.027] [-0.029] [0.045] [0.18] [0.104]
Cigar Tax -0.083 -0.036 -0.035 -0.013 -0.012 -0.031
(0.060) (0.039) (0.046) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Elasticity [-0.090] [-0.069] [-0.042] [-0.034] [-0.041] [-0.051]
Observations 201,921 201,921 201,921 665,454 665,454 665,454
Notes: The above table presents marginal effects from the logistic regression of cigarette/cigar/marijuana
use on cigarette and cigar tax. Columns (1)-(3) use the YRBS 1999-2005. Columns (4)-(6) use the YRBS
2007-2017. All columns use state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and additional covariates. Covariates
not reported are race, gender, age, marijuana decriminalization laws, smoke-free air restrictions, state per
capita personal income, state unemployment rate, e-cigarette minimum age laws, dummy for e-cigarette tax,
medical marijuana laws (MML), recreational marijuana laws (RML). The elasticity is reported in square
brackets. The standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.
1.5.0.3 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Smoking: By Gender and Race
Table 1.8 shows the effect of cigarette and cigar tax on cigarette and cigar use by gender.
For females, the elasticity of cigarette use with cigarette tax is negative and statistically
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significant. The elasticity of cigar and marijuana use with cigarette tax is positive and
statistically significant. A one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to an 0.18 percent
increase in cigar use and a 0.06 percent increase in marijuana use. The cross-tax elasticity of
cigarette use with cigar tax is negative, but it is statistically insignificant. Cigar taxes do not
have a significant effect on cigarette, cigar, or marijuana use among females. Among males,
an increase in cigarette taxes does not affect cigarette use but leads to an increase in cigar
and marijuana use. An increase in cigar tax has a small and negative effect on cigarette,
cigar, and marijuana use. The cross-tax elasticity of cigarettes and cigars is of opposite signs
and is statistically significant. This suggests that higher cigarette taxes lead both males and
females to switch from cigarettes to cigars and marijuana.
Table 1.9 shows the effect of cigarette and cigar tax on cigarette and cigar use by
race. Among blacks, an increase in cigarette tax has no effect on cigarette use, but it leads
to an increase in cigar and marijuana use. A one-percent increase in cigarette tax leads to a
0.28 percent increase in cigar use and a 0.15 percent increase in marijuana use. The cross-tax
elasticities are large compared to the elasticity for whites or hispanics. The effect of cigar
tax on cigarette and cigar use is small, negative, and statistically insignificant. The cross-tax
elasticity of marijuana use with cigar tax is negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that marijuana and cigars are complements. Among whites, cigarette taxes do not affect
cigarette use but lead to an increase in cigar and marijuana use. The effect of cigar tax on
cigarette, cigar, and marijuana use is small and negative. Among hispanics, higher cigarette
taxes lead to an increase in cigar and marijuana use. In sum, higher cigarette tax leads to
switching from cigarettes to cigar and marijuana. All groups consider cigar and marijuana
as complements, and cigarettes and marijuana as substitutes.
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Table 1.8 Tobacco Taxes and Youth Smoking: By Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male
Cigarette Cigar Marijuana Cigarette Cigar Marijuana
Cigarette Tax -0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.004 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Elasticity [-0.090] [0.181] [0.061] [0.039] [0.113] [0.075]
Cigar Tax -0.014 0.002 -0.023 -0.032∗∗ -0.007 -0.039∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
Elasticity [-0.029] [0.0083] [-0.037] [-0.058] [-0.014] [-0.054]
Observations 449,588 449,588 449,588 417,787 417,787 417,787
Mean 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.21
Notes: The above table presents marginal effects from the logistic regression of cigarette/cigar/marijuana
use on cigarette and cigar tax, for males and females. Columns (1)-(3) show the estimates for the sample
of females and columns (4)-(6) show the estimates for males. All columns use state fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and additional covariates. Covariates not reported are race, gender, age, marijuana decriminalization
laws, smoke-free air restrictions, state per capita personal income, state unemployment rate, e-cigarette
minimum age laws, dummy for e-cigarette tax, medical marijuana laws (MML), recreational marijuana laws
(RML). The elasticity is reported in square brackets. The standard errors are clustered at the state level


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the 1990s, the focus of tobacco control policy is almost exclusively on reducing cigarette
use. Cigarette taxes have increased substantially while cigar taxes have not caught up. It
has created widening disparities in the price of cigarettes and cigars. Most prior research has
analyzed changes in smoking exclusively through cigarette taxes and cigarette use, without
much attention to cigar tax and cigar use. Using the National and State YRBS, I examine the
effect of cigarette and cigar taxes on cigarette and cigar use among youth. I find that cigarette
taxes marginally reduce cigarette use but increase cigar and marijuana use. Increases in cigar
taxes have an even smaller effect on reducing cigarette and cigar use. Moreover, switching
from cigarettes to cigars has been more prominent since the last decade, when larger cigarette
tax increases took place. These results have important implications for policymakers, which
I summarize below.
First, future increase in cigarette tax will not lead to a reduction in cigarette or cigar
use. On the contrary, a further increase in cigarette tax is likely to lead to an increase in cigar
use. Second, prior increase in cigar tax has not reduced cigarette or cigar use significantly
among youth. As cigarettes become more expensive, cigars provide young smokers with an
economically attractive alternative. Regulations on cigars are weaker than cigarettes, and
cigar tax increases have been infrequent. Cigars offer a similar nicotine delivery system as
cigarettes, are available in sweet flavors, and are significantly cheaper than cigarettes. Cigars
allow young smokers to consume tobacco in a staggered manner as they come in smaller packs
(two cigars compared to 20 cigarettes). Additionally, cigars are rolled in tobacco leaf (as
opposed to cigarettes rolled in paper), making them an attractive complement to smoke
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on-the-go with marijuana. An effective policy to reduce cigarette and cigar use among youth
would be to increase the cost of cigars (regulations on flavor, size, packs, and higher taxes).
It is unlikely that stricter regulations on cigars will lead smokers to switch from cigars
to cigarettes (cigarettes being five times as expensive as cigars per unit). Additionally,
policymakers need to consider that the high prevalence of marijuana and its complementary
relationship with cigars lowers the effectiveness of tobacco taxes in reducing cigar use.
This study contributes to the growing literature on tobacco control policy and its
spillover effects on cigarette alternatives and marijuana. Unlike previous studies, I take into
account different tobacco taxes to establish the relationship between cigarettes and cigars.
However, this study suffers from some caveats that provide directions for future research.
First, I assume that all individuals have similar tastes and can switch between cigarettes
and cigars. It is possible that individuals have different tastes, and some non-price-sensitive
cigarette users do not consider cigars as a viable alternative. This can be understood by
estimating a full mixture model, with price-sensitive and non-price-sensitive cigarette users
as two sub-groups. Second, although I use the information on cigarette tax, cigar tax, and
marijuana legalization, I am unable to control for marijuana prices due to a lack of reliable
data. An important extension would be to see how marijuana prices affect cigarette, cigar,
and marijuana use. Third, the information in the YRBS data is self-reported, with potential
misreporting in tobacco or marijuana use. Future research should account for misreporting
and explore how tobacco and marijuana use is affected by tobacco taxes. Fourth, I focus on
the short-term effects of tobacco taxes. There is a need for future research to understand the
long-term relationship between tobacco taxes, tobacco, and marijuana use. Fifth, electronic
cigarettes are a growing alternative to cigarettes among youth. It is essential to understand
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how the prevalence of e-cigarettes and related anti-smoking policies affect cigarette, cigar,
and marijuana use among youth.
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Chapter 2
Does Smoking Reduce Obesity? Reconciling the Conflicting Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Smoking and obesity are the two leading causes of preventable deaths in the United States.1
Almost 40% of adults in the United States are obese (Hales et al. (2017)), while roughly 14%
of adults in the U.S. smoke according to the CDC.2 In Figure 2.1, we show that smoking
decreased from roughly 22% to 15% between 2002 and 2017 according to the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), while obesity rose from roughly 26.75% to 28.25%
during the same time period. While these trends do not present causal evidence, they raise
the question of whether the decline in smoking has contributed to rising obesity. If so, the
health benefits of anti-smoking policies may be somewhat overstated.
Using Grossman’s human capital model of health, we can consider health a capital stock
that depreciates over time but can be replenished by investment (Grossman, 1972). Assum-
ing an individual starts at her optimal body weight, both smoking and weight gain represent
disinvestments. Cigarettes contain nicotine, which suppresses appetite and increases one’s
metabolic rate. Thus, smoking cigarettes tends to reduce body weight, all else equal. How-
ever, smoking also reduces lung capacity, which may restrict physical activity and thereby
increase body weight. Because the causal effect of smoking on obesity is theoretically am-
biguous, determining the true relationship is an empirical question.




2See https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm, last ac-
cessed February 19, 2020
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obesity, though the findings are quite mixed. Using BRFSS data from 1984 to 1999, Chou
et al. (2004) suggest that reduced smoking increases body mass index (BMI) by finding
increasing cigarette prices have a large positive effect on BMI. Using BRFSS data from 1984
to 2002/2005, Gruber and Frakes (2006) and Courtemanche (2009) examine this relationship
more closely using cigarette taxes instead of cigarette prices.3 The authors find that an
increase in cigarette taxes (i.e. reduced smoking) reduces BMI. However, several other studies
around the same time use different observational data or approaches to causal identification
to suggest that reduced smoking increases BMI (Baum, 2009; Fang et al., 2009; Liu et al.,
2010). Moreover, Courtemanche et al. (2018) also find that reduced smoking increases BMI
using a randomized trial of smoking cessation treatments and clinically-measured carbon
monoxide levels.
The mixed findings highlight the complexity of identifying the causal effect of smoking
on BMI. In particular, two concerns stand out from the literature. First, estimates are
sensitive to different approaches to identification and choice of specification. Second, esti-
mates are sensitive to the source of data, which raises the concern that results obtained from
self-reported data (as opposed to clinically-measured experimental data) are biased by sys-
tematic misreporting. For example, studies have found that accounting for misreporting can
significantly impact estimates of marijuana usage, as well as the magnitude and direction of
estimated effects of nutritional assistance programs on BMI and obesity (Greene et al., 2017;
Almada et al., 2016; Nguimkeu et al., 2019). A large body of medical research has revealed
widespread underreporting based on comparisons of self-reported smoking to biochemical
3Note that Courtemanche (2009) actually uses BRFSS data to examine the robustness of his central
estimates obtained using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Indeed, the author finds that both
data sources yield similar estimates.
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indicators of tobacco intake (e.g., Gorber et al., 2009; Nesson, 2017). To our knowledge, no
one has examined how misreporting affects estimates of the impact of smoking on BMI.
In this paper, we aim to reconcile the mixed findings in the existing literature. To do this,
we use BRFSS data from 2002 to 2017 to examine how specification choice and accounting
for misreporting affect estimates of the effect of smoking on BMI. In particular, we employ
a variety of linear and non-linear instrumental variables approaches, using cigarette taxes
as plausibly exogeneous shifters of smoking behavior. To account for misreporting, we use
the 2-step estimation procedure proposed by Nguimkeu et al. (2019). First, we replicate the
findings of Gruber and Frakes (2006) and Courtemanche (2009) using our more recent data,
obtaining estimates suggesting that reduced smoking reduces BMI. Second, we show that
using a non-linear first stage yields estimates of roughly the same magnitude but the sign
is flipped, suggesting that reduced smoking increases BMI. Finally, using a non-linear first
stage and accounting for misreporting, we obtain estimates consistent with the experimental
literature in both sign and magnitude. These findings suggest that both specification choice
and accounting for misreporting may help reconcile the discrepancies among earlier studies.
Our preferred estimate suggests that quitting smoking results in a 1.06 increase in BMI.
From 2002-17, our findings suggest that the decline in smoking explains roughly 6% of the
concurrent rise in obesity, reinforcing the notion that increased obesity may be an unintended
consequence of anti-smoking policy efforts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed review
of the literature. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 develops our various approaches to
estimation and presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
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Figure 2.1 Trends in Smoking and Obesity (BRFSS 2002-2017)
2.2 Literature Review
Instrumental variables (IV) approaches are common in the literature on the relationship
between smoking and body weight. This is because smoking behavior may be endogenous, as
individuals generally self-select into smoking. There are also concerns about reverse causality.
That is, body weight may affect an individual’s decision of whether or not to smoke (Cawley
et al., 2004; Rees and Sabia, 2010). The literature has primarily used cigarette prices and
taxes as plausibly exogeneous instruments, as they shift the cost of smoking but do not seem
to have a direct causal relationship with BMI.
In Table 2.3, we catalog the main estimates from earlier literature on the relationship
between smoking and BMI. First, Chou et al. (2004) use BRFSS data from 1984 to 1999
to estimate the determinants of BMI and obesity, and find large positive effects of cigarette
prices. Assuming cigarette prices affect individuals only through smoking, these results
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suggest that reductions in smoking contribute to increases in body weight. In contrast,
using BRFSS data from 1984 to 2002 and cigarette taxes instead of prices, Gruber and
Frakes (2006) examine this question more closely and find that reduced smoking reduces
BMI and obesity rates. The authors propose two possible explanations for why their results
differ from those of Chou et al. (2004). First, taxes may be better instruments than prices,
as variation in prices may be driven by factors affecting both BMI and demand for cigarettes.
Second, Gruber and Frakes (2006) use month-year fixed effects rather than quadratic time
trends to more flexibly control for unobservable location-invariant shocks over time. However,
the authors caution that their IV estimates may be implausibly large, as they suggest that
individuals who quit smoking are 56% less likely to be obese. Courtemanche (2009) revisits
Gruber and Frakes (2006) using both BRFSS and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), and also finds that reduced smoking reduces BMI and obesity rates. Moreover, the
author shows that this result is robust to a range of alternative linear specifications.
Other studies around the same time, however, challenge these findings. Baum (2009) use
the NLSY for years 1979 through 2002 to estimate the body-weight effects of real cigarette
prices and taxes. Using a standard differences-in-differences approach, they find that an
increase in the cost of cigarettes (i.e. a reduction in smoking) increases BMI and obesity
rates. Fang et al. (2009) use data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS),
leveraging number of cigarettes smoked and the local per-pack price of the most popular
cigarette brand as IVs. Similarly, they find that reduced smoking increases BMI, though
they find small and statistically insignificant effects on obesity rates. Liu et al. (2010) use
worksite smoking bans along with BRFSS data from 1998 to 2006 to find further evidence


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, a more recent study by Courtemanche et al. (2018) uses clinical measurements
from an experimental setting to provide additional consistent evidence. In particular, they
use data from a randomized trial of smoking cessation treatments. Rather than relying on
self-reported smoking, which seems to suffer from widespread underreporting, they observe
clinically-measured carbon monoxide levels. They find that, in the short run, quitting smok-
ing leads to a gain of 10-11 pounds at average height. In the long run, this effect increases
to 11-12 pounds. However, this study focuses on individuals who are trying to quit smoking
during the years 1990-1994, which some may argue casts doubt on the external validity of
the findings.
If nothing else, the mixed evidence highlights the challenges inherent in estimating the
causal relationship between smoking and body weight. In the following sections, we aim
to reconcile these seemingly contradictory results. In particular, we argue that specification
choice, functional form, and misreporting may explain the apparent discrepancies across pre-
vious studies.
2.3 Data
We start with repeated cross-sectional data from the 2002 through 2017 waves of the BRFSS,
which is a health-focused telephone survey conducted by the CDC. The survey collects in-
formation on health-related risky behaviors among U.S. residents, as well as chronic health
conditions and use of preventative services. The BRFSS was first established in 1984, with
12,258 participants across 14 states. In 2017, the data include approximately 430,000 partici-
pants from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Starting in 2002, the BRFSS contains
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information on interviewer performance and whether a respondent fully or partially com-
pleted the interview. Because we use this information to account for possible misreporting,
we restrict our main estimation sample to the years 2002-2017.
In particular, we use the core module that includes self-reported height, weight, demo-
graphics, tobacco use, health status, and chronic health conditions. Following Gruber and
Frakes (2006), we restrict our sample to respondents under 65 years of age. After also drop-
ping observations with missing data for our key variables of interest, our sample contains
roughly 3.6 million observations. We calculate BMI using respondents’ self-reported height
and weight, removing extreme outliers by dropping the bottom and top 1% of BMI values,
which leaves us with a range of 17.75 to 46.39. Using CDC guidelines, we define a cur-
rent smoker as one who reported smoking at least 100 cigarettes during their lifetime, and,
at the time of participation, reported that they currently smoke either some days or every
day. We also use several additional individual-level covariates, including marital status, race,
education, and income. As in Gruber and Frakes (2006), we include age-by-gender group
indicators.
We supplement our BRFSS data with information on state excise cigarette taxes from
the CDC’s Tax Burden on Tobacco (TBOT) dataset. The TBOT reports tax rates at the
end of October every year, along with the exact date(s) of any rate changes, which we
use to determine monthly tax rates. We convert nominal tax rates to 2017 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Because the BRFSS asks
individuals about their behavior over the past 30 days, we follow the previous literature
in assigning tax rates to individuals based on the month preceding their survey interview.
Finally, we include a time-varying measure of state-level unemployment from the Bureau of
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Labor Studies to account for economic conditions that may be correlated with body weight,
smoking, and/or cigarette taxes.
In Table 2.2, we report the summary statistics for the BRFSS 2002-2017, adjusted for the
stratified sampling weights provided by the CDC. Using survey weights is important in this
context, as BRFSS oversamples different population groups across different years depending
on the guidance from the CDC. In our sample, 18% of respondents are identified as smokers.
The average BMI among smokers is 27.11, which is lower than the average non-smoker BMI
of 27.48. In addition, we see that 66% of individuals are white, 11% are black, and 6%
are hispanic. In addition, 51% of individuals are female, 28-29% have a high school and/or
technical degree, and 32% are college graduates.
In the sample, the mean (real) cigarette excise tax is $2.14. The highest observed nominal
tax is $4.35 in New York and Connecticut in 2017, while the lowest in 2017 is $0.17 in
Missouri (see Table 2.3). In addition to substantial across-state variation in tax magnitudes,
taxes vary substantitally across time within states. Between 2002 and 2017, there were 132
nominal tax increases.
Finally, the variable we use to account for misreporting is called “Final Disposition” in
the BRFSS data. This indicates whether the respondent fully completed their interview, and
we use it to predict whether an individual is less likely to answer questions truthfully. We find
that approximately 10% of respondents in our sample only partially complete their interview.
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics
Non-Smoker Smoker Full Sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
BMI 27.77 5.47 27.18 5.41 27.65 5.46
Current Cigarette Smoker - - - - 0.21 0.41
Cigarette Tax (2017 $) 2.25 1.06 2.10 1.03 2.22 1.06
Male 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50
Black 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28
White 0.78 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.78 0.42
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
Married 0.63 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.59 0.49
Divorced 0.13 0.34 0.23 0.42 0.15 0.36
Widowed 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18
Grade 9-11 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.31 0.05 0.22
High School 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.49 0.27 0.44
Technical Degree 0.27 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45
College Graduate 0.44 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.38 0.49
Disposition Rate 0.93 0.26 0.92 0.27 0.93 0.26
Income (2017 $) 69,497 38,164 48,445 35,449 65,088 38,575
State Unemployment Rate 5.96 2.09 5.97 2.04 5.96 2.08
Observations 2,843,312 753,331 3,596,643
2.4 Estimation and Results
In this section, we start by obtaining näıve OLS estimates of the relationship between smok-
ing and BMI via OLS, and then estimate a variety of IV specifications. Throughout, we follow
the previous literature in specifying the following structural linear model of the relationship
between BMI and smoking:
BMIisy = αSisy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + εisy (2.1)
where S indicates current smoking status for individual i in state s and month-year y. X
is a vector of individual- and state-level covariates, τy are month-year fixed effects, µs are
state fixed effects, and ηisy is an idiosyncratic error term. X includes individuals’ income,
race, marital status, education, age, gender, an age-by-gender interaction term, and state
unemployment rate from the BLS.
In the first row, second panel of Table 2.4, we find that the näıve OLS estimate of the
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Table 2.3 Variation in Nominal Cigarette Taxes (2002-2017)
State Tax in January 2002 ($) Tax in Dec 2017 ($) No. of increases
Alabama 0.165 0.675 2
Alaska 1 2 3
Arizona 0.60 2 2
Arkansas 0.34 1.15 2
California 0.87 2.87 1
Colorado 0.20 0.84 1
Connecticut 0.50 4.35 8
Delaware 0.24 2.10 4
District of Columbia 0.65 2.50 2
Florida 0.339 1.339 1
Georgia 0.12 0.37 1
Hawaii 1 3.2 9
Idaho 0.28 0.57 1
Illinois 0.58 1.98 2
Indiana 0.155 0.995 2
Iowa 0.36 1.36 1
Kansas 0.24 1.29 3
Kentucky 0.03 0.60 3
Louisiana 0.24 1.08 3
Maine 1 2 1
Maryland 0.66 2 2
Massachusetts 0.76 3.51 3
Michigan 0.75 2 2
Minnesota 0.48 3.04 5
Mississippi 0.18 0.68 1
Missouri 0.17 0.17 0
Montana 0.18 1.70 2
Nebraska 0.34 0.64 1
Nevada 0.35 1.80 2
New Hampshire 0.52 1.78 5
New Jersey 0.80 2.70 5
New Mexico 0.21 1.66 2
New York 1.11 4.35 3
North Carolina 0.05 0.45 3
North Dakota 0.44 0.44 0
Ohio 0.24 1.60 3
Oklahama 0.23 1.03 1
Oregon 0.68 1.32 4
Pennsylvania 0.31 2.60 4
Rhode Island 1 4.25 7
South Carolina 0.07 0.57 1
South Dakota 0.33 1.53 2
Tennessee 0.13 0.62 2
Texas 0.41 1.41 1
Utah 0.515 1.70 2
Vermont 0.44 3.08 7
Virginia 0.025 0.30 2
Washington 1.425 3.025 3
West Virginia 0.17 1.20 2
Wisconsin 0.77 2.52 2
Wyoming 0.12 0.60 1
relationship between smoking and BMI is negative. For OLS, and all our other estimation
approaches, we present three specifications. Column 1 presents the results when we only
include state and month-year fixed effects. Column 2 presents the results when we only
include the set of covariates (income, race, marital status, educational attainment, age-
by-gender dummies, and state unemployment rate). Column 3 presents the results when
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including both the fixed effects and covariates. In our preferred specification, column 3, we
estimate that quitting smoking is associated with a BMI increase of 0.7 (2.5% relative to
average BMI of 27.65). For someone who is 5’ 7” tall and 180 pounds (BMI = 28.2), this
corresponds to an increase of roughly 4.5 pounds.
Our first IV approach is a standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, which
follows Gruber and Frakes (2006) closely. Next, we obtain estimates from two alternative
IV approaches where the first stage is non-linear. The first is a corrected version of the
“forbidden regression.” The second is a control function approach. Finally, we implement
a 2-step estimator proposed by Nguimkeu et al. (2019) to account for the possibility of
misreporting. Following the large economic literature on smoking, we use cigarette taxes
to instrument for smoking status throughout these analyses. In addition, we weight our
regressions throughout by the BRFSS-provided stratified sampling weights.4
Two-Stage Least Squares
In this approach, following Gruber and Frakes (2006), the first stage is specified as a linear
probability model:
Sisy = ψTaxsy +Xisyφ+ τy + µs + ηisy (2.2)
Tax is the identifying instrument, which reflects the real excise cigarette tax (in 2017 $).
The corresponding second stage is given by:
BMIisy = αŜisy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + εisy (2.3)
4See appendix for non-weighted estimates.
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where Ŝ is predicted smoking status from the first stage, and α is the causal parameter of
interest.
Table 2.4 presents the results from the analysis using 2SLS. In the first stage (row 1, top
panel, column 3), we estimate that a $1 increase in the real cigarette excise tax significantly
reduces the probability of being a smoker by 0.6 percentage points. We also present the
F-statistic, which is 16.4 for this specification, suggesting that cigarette taxes are indeed
a strong predictor of smoking behavior. Note that we do not find a statistically signifi-
cant direct relationship between BMI and cigarette taxes, where the reduced form estimate
presented in column 3 of the middle panel suggests that a $1 tax increase statistically in-
significantly reduces BMI by 0.025. In row 2, column 3 of the bottom panel, our 2SLS
estimate suggests that quitting smoking reduces BMI by roughly 4.2 (or a reduction of 27
pounds for someone 5’ 7” tall and 180 pounds). While the standard error of the 2SLS esti-
mate is roughly 50% larger than the coefficient, the magnitude is in line with the estimate
of 5.7 from Gruber and Frakes (2006) using BRFSS data from 1984-2002 and our replication
of that estimate of 5.34 (s.e. = 3.25). That said, as pointed out by the authors themselves,
it still seems to be unreasonably large when compared to the rest of the literature.
In addition, it is also worth noting that the 2SLS estimates are relatively unstable across
specifications. When including fixed effects but no covariates, the 2SLS estimate is similar
but smaller (3.49). However, when including covariates and excluding fixed effects, the sign
flips and the magnitude is much smaller (-0.79, more in line with the stable “näıve” OLS
estimates of -0.4 to -0.7). In the following subsections, we show (1) the sign of the estimates
is consistently negative when using a nonlinear first stage and (2) conditional on including
covariates, the results are not nearly as sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects. Moreover,
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we show that when using a nonlinear first stage that accounts for misreporting, the results
are stable across all three specifications.
Nonlinear-Fits-as-Instruments
Next, we would like to estimate the relationship between smoking and BMI by using a
probit model for the first stage to obtain predicted smoking status, and then substituting
predicted smoking status for observed smoking status in a linear second stage. However, this
was famously dubbed the “forbidden regression” by Hausman, since only a linear first stage
estimated via OLS is “guaranteed to produce first-stage residuals that are uncorrelated with
fitted values and covariates” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
To correct for this, we use the nonlinear-fits-as-instruments (hereafter, NFI) approach
suggested by Newey (1990). The NFI approach has three stages, which we describe below
as stages zero, one, and two. Stage zero is given by:
Sisy = ψTaxsy +Xisyφ+ τy + µs + ηisy, (2.4)
which we estimate as a probit model to obtain predicted smoking status Ŝ. Then, in stage
one, we estimate S as a function of Ŝ along with our set of controls:
Sisy = θŜisy +Xisyγ + τy + µs + uisy. (2.5)
Finally, we estimate stage two of the NFI model, where BMI is specified as a function of
predicted smoking from stage one, S̃, and the set of controls:
BMIisy = αS̃isy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + εisy. (2.6)
Note that this approach identifies α using both taxes and nonlinearities in stage zero.
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While using nonlinearities as identifying information may be somewhat undesirable, Newey
(1990) shows that the resulting estimates are more efficient when the probit model is a better
approximation of the first-stage conditional expectation function.
Turning to Table 2.4, row 2, column 3 of the top panel reveals a very similar first stage
relationship as in 2SLS. Specifically, the estimate suggests that a $1 increase in the real
cigarette excise tax reduces the probability of being a smoker by 0.006 percentage points. The
first stage F-statistic is 11.38, again, suggesting that cigarette taxes are a strong predictor
of smoking. However, turning to row 3, column 3 of the bottom panel, we find that the
estimated effect is similar in magnitude to 2SLS but the direction of the relationship is
flipped. That is, our NFI estimate suggests that quitting smoking increases BMI by 6.2
(roughly 40 pounds for someone 5’ 7” tall and 180 pounds). In this specification, as opposed
to 2SLS, the standard errors are much smaller and the coefficient is highly statistically
significant. That said, the magnitude still appears to be unreasonably large relative to the
rest of the literature. While the corresponding NFI estimate when we include fixed effects
and exclude covariates is particularly unreasonably large (-20.9) and imprecise (s.e. = 16.2),
when we include covariates the estimates are not as sensitive as 2SLS to the inclusion of
fixed effects (-4.5 without fixed effects vs. -6.2 with fixed effects).
Control Function
Next, we estimate the causal relationship of interest using a nonlinear (probit) first stage via
the control function (hereafter, CF) approach. Again, the first stage is given by:
Sisy = ψTaxsy +Xisyφ+ τy + µs + ηisy. (2.7)
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Table 2.4 Effect of Smoking on BMI
(1) (2) (3)
First Stage: Regress Smoking Status on Cigarette Taxes
2SLS -0.005∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
[9.18] [20.77] [16.38]
NFI & CF -0.006∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
[6.74] [20.48] [11.38]
2-Step -0.005∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
[128.16] [66.90] [36.95]
Linear Reduced Form: Regress BMI on Cigarette Taxes
Cigarette Taxes -0.019 0.012 -0.025
(0.050) (0.048) (0.042)
Second Stage: Regress BMI on Predicted Smoking Status
OLS -0.404∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.089) (0.080)
2SLS 3.489 -0.792 4.200
(8.260) (3.081) (6.302)
NFI -20.890 -4.526∗∗∗ -6.210∗∗∗
(16.168) (1.248) (0.631)
CF -11.270 -5.482∗∗∗ -7.366∗∗∗
(8.615) (1.510) (0.760)
2-Step -0.678 -0.495 -1.059∗∗
(1.484) (0.937) (0.499)
Observations 3,596,643 3,596,643 3,596,643
State FE X X
Quarter-Year FE X X
All covariates X X
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the state-level. F / Chi-
Square statistics are presented in brackets. Data are from the BRFSS 2002-2017. We weight observations by
BRFSS-provided survey weights. Estimators include ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables
(2SLS), Newey correction to the forbidden regression (NFI), the control function approach (CF), and 2-step
to correct for misreporting (2S). For comparison purposes, the first stage estimates for NFI and CF that we
present are obtained by calculating the marginal effects. The first stage estimates for 2S that we present
are obtained by regressing predicted true smoking status on cigarette taxes and controls via OLS. Note: the
coefficient on the disposition variable in the first stage of the 2-step estimator is -0.021 (s.e. is 0.010). *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
49
After estimating this probit model, we obtain the residuals (Res) and use them as a covariate
in the second stage. The second stage is given by:
BMIisy = αSisy + δResisy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + εisy (2.8)
where S is self-reported smoking status, Res are the residuals from the first stage, along with
the usual set of additional controls. The estimated α from the second stage is our causal
parameter of interest.
The results presented in row 2, column 3 of the top panel of Table 2.4 reflect the first
stage estimates for both the NFI and CF approaches, as they both use the exact same first
stage specification. Turning to row 4, column 3 of the bottom panel, we see that the estimate
is quite similar to the NFI estimate (negative relationship) but slightly larger in magnitude
(-7.4 vs. the NFI estimate of -6.2). As in the NFI specification, the standard error is much
smaller than that of the 2SLS estimate and the coefficient of interest is highly statistically
significant. Again, while the corresponding CF estimate when we include fixed effects and
exclude covariates is unreasonably large (-11.3) and imprecise (s.e. = 8.6), when we include
covariates the estimates are not as sensitive as 2SLS to the inclusion of fixed effects (-5.5
without fixed effects vs. -7.4 with fixed effects).
Even though the sign flips when using a nonlinear first stage, which is in line with the
experimental literature, the estimates are still unreasonably large compared to the rest of the
literature on the relationship between smoking and BMI. In the next subsection, we show
that accounting for misreporting in smoking status has a substantial impact on the stability
of the estimates while bringing them back within a reasonable range.
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2-step estimator
Using the 2-step estimator allows us to account for misreporting of smoking in the BRFSS
data, following Nguimkeu et al. (2019). Suppose the outcome variable of interest, BMI, is
a function of correctly-measured exogeneous covariates X and the (true) smoking indicator,
S∗. In particular, we specify:
BMIisy = αS
∗
isy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + εisy. (2.9)
where α is the key parameter of interest.
We model true smoking status (S∗) as a function of X and the exogenous instrument
Tax:
S∗isy = 1(θTaxsy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + visy ≥ 0). (2.10)
However, we only observe self-reported smoking status, S, which is a surrogate of one’s true
smoking status. Thus, we can consider Si = S
∗
i di, where d is an indicator of misreporting. If
an individual truthfully reports their smoking status, d = 1 (0 otherwise). Note that S = S∗
for true non-smokers regardless of misreporting. That is, we assume a true non-smoker would
not falsely report smoking. Next, we model d as a function of observable covariates X and
disposition Disp:





= 1(θTaxsy +Xisyβ + τy + µs + visy ≥ 0 ; ρDispisy +Xisyγ + τy + µs + uisy ≥ 0).
(2.12)
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In the first step, we estimate equation Equation 2.12 using a partial observability probit
model, which allows us to predict each individual’s true smoking status, Ŝ∗. In the second
stage, we estimate equation Equation 2.9, substituting Ŝ∗ in for S∗. The resulting α is the 2-
step estimate of the true causal effect of smoking on obesity when accounting for endogenous
misreporting.
The results of this approach, presented in row 3 of the top panel of Table 2.4, again
yield very similar first-stage estimates of the effect of cigarette taxes on smoking. In our
preferred specification (column 3), the first-stage F-statistic is 36.95, again suggesting that
cigarette taxes are strong predictors of smoking. Turning to row 5 of the bottom panel, we
find a negative relationship between smoking and obesity as in the NFI and CF approaches.
However, here we find that quitting smoking leads to an increase in BMI of only 1.06 (about
7 pounds for someone 5’ 7” tall and 180 pounds). Relative to our nonlinear specifications
that do not consider misreporting, this estimate is much closer to the experimental 2SLS
estimate obtained by Courtemanche et al. (2018), who find that quitting smoking increases
BMI by 2.2 (about 14 pounds) when using clinically-measured carbon monoxide levels to
determine smoking behavior among participants in a smoking cessation randomized trial.
Moreover, we find that this 2-step approach yields a much more stable pattern of estimates
across our three specifications, where the estimates only range between -0.50 and -1.06.
Heterogeneity
Finally, we use the 2-step estimator to examine heterogeneity in the effects of smoking on
BMI across age, gender, and U.S. census region. While we will focus primarily on presenting
the 2-step results, note that we also present the results of OLS, 2SLS, NFI, and CF estimation
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for comparison purposes.
Turning first to Table 2.5, our 2-step estimates suggest that cigarette taxes have a slightly
larger impact on smoking among respondents aged 41-65: a reduction of 1.1 percentage points
in the probability of being a smoker for a $1 increase in taxes compared to 0.8 points for those
aged 18-40. In terms of the effects of smoking status on BMI, however, we find that quitting
smoking has a larger positive impact on BMI among the 18-40 age group: an increase of
4.2 (27 pounds for someone 5’ 7” and 180 pounds) compared to only 0.8 (5 pounds) among
those aged 41-65.
Next, looking at Table 2.6, our 2-step estimates suggest that cigarette taxes have a
substantially larger impact on smoking among female respondents: a 1.2 percentage point
smoking reduction compared to 0.6 for men. Interestingly, we find that quitting smoking
results in a significantly larger weight gain for men than women: 6.9 BMI points for men
compared to a statistically insignificant decrease of 1.3 BMI points for women.
Finally, in Table 2.7, we examine regional differences in the relationship between smoking
and BMI. Looking in row 5 of the bottom panel, we find that quitting smoking increases
BMI by 3.2 to 4.5 in the northeast and midwest, while we find no statistically discernable
relationship among respondents in the southern and western regions of the United States.
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Table 2.5 Effect of Smoking on BMI by Age
OLS 2SLS NFI CF 2-Step
Panel A: Age 18-40
First Stage (DV = Smoking Status)
Cigarette Taxes - -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
- (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
- [8.62] [5.17] [5.17] [75.27]
Second Stage (DV = BMI)
Smoking Status -0.195∗∗ 4.039 -2.575∗∗∗ -3.276∗∗∗ -4.217∗∗∗
(0.082) (9.465) (0.539) (0.676) (0.542)
Observations 1,218,758 1,218,758 1,218,758 1,218,758 1,218,758
Panel B: Age 41-65
First Stage (DV = Smoking Status)
Cigarette Taxes - -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
- (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
- [23.46] [21.99] [21.99] [31.19]
Second Stage (DV = BMI)
Smoking Status -1.422∗∗∗ 4.112 -6.058∗∗∗ -7.184∗∗∗ -0.784
(0.079) (4.690) (0.485) (0.595) (0.791)
Observations 2,377,885 2,377,885 2,377,885 2,377,885 2,377,885
Notes: All specifications include covariates, year-quarter fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors
are presented in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the state-level. F / Chi-Square statistics are
presented in brackets. Data are from the BRFSS 2002-2017. We weight observations by BRFSS-provided
survey weights. Estimators include ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables (2SLS), Newey
correction to the forbidden regression (NFI), the control function approach (CF), and 2-step to correct for
misreporting (2S). For comparison purposes, the first stage estimates for NFI and CF that we present are
obtained by calculating the marginal effects. The first stage estimates for 2S that we present are obtained
by regressing predicted true smoking status on cigarette taxes and controls via OLS. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 2.6 Effect of Smoking on BMI by Gender
OLS 2SLS NFI CF 2-Step
Panel A: Male
First Stage (DV = Smoking Status)
Cigarette Taxes - -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
- (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
- [7.57] [6.77] [6.77] [76.07]
Second Stage (DV = BMI)
Smoking Status -0.778∗∗∗ 3.871 -4.514∗∗∗ -4.844∗∗∗ -6.893∗∗∗
(0.091) (5.632) (0.532) (0.579) (0.499)
Observations 1,564,310 1,564,310 1,564,310 1,564,310 1,564,310
Panel B: Female
First Stage (DV = Smoking Status)
Cigarette Taxes - -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
- (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
- [24.56] [14.58] [14.58] [25.25]
Second Stage (DV = BMI)
Smoking Status -0.521∗∗∗ 3.214 -0.876∗∗ -1.002∗ 1.296
(0.078) (6.941) (0.392) (0.509) (0.976)
Observations 2,032,333 2,032,333 2,032,333 2,032,333 2,032,333
All specifications include covariates, year-quarter fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors
are presented in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the state-level. F / Chi-Square statistics are
presented in brackets. Data are from the BRFSS 2002-2017. We weight observations by BRFSS-provided
survey weights. Estimators include ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables (2SLS), Newey
correction to the forbidden regression (NFI), the control function approach (CF), and 2-step to correct for
misreporting (2S). For comparison purposes, the first stage estimates for NFI and CF that we present are
obtained by calculating the marginal effects. The first stage estimates for 2S that we present are obtained
by regressing predicted true smoking status on cigarette taxes and controls via OLS. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 2.7 Effect of Smoking on BMI: By Census Region
NE MW SO WE
First Stage: Regress Smoking Status on Cigarette Taxes
2SLS -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
[13.31] [7.85] [2.77] [0.00]
NFI & CF -0.007∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
[10.63] [9.17] [3.50] [0.39]
2-Step -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[10.15] [24.43] [4.99] [10.92]
Second Stage: Regress BMI on Predicted Smoking Status
OLS -0.507∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗∗ -0.932∗∗∗ -0.340∗
(0.092) (0.064) (0.086) (0.160)
2SLS 15.345∗∗∗ 1.233 3.901 -3,394
(1.914) (5.931) (4.456) (344,919)
NFI -5.741∗∗∗ -6.904∗∗∗ -5.825∗∗∗ -6.330∗∗∗
(0.830) (0.804) (0.406) (0.800)
CF -6.521∗∗∗ -7.680∗∗∗ -7.111∗∗∗ -7.180∗∗∗
(0.969) (0.926) (0.544) (0.892)
2-Step -3.198∗∗∗ -4.492∗∗∗ 0.673 -0.900
(0.654) (0.389) (0.577) (0.742)
Observations 696,936 879,807 1,122,084 897,816
Notes: All specifications include covariates, year-quarter fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors
are presented in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the state-level. F / Chi-Square statistics are
presented in brackets. Data are from the BRFSS 2002-2017. We weight observations by BRFSS-provided
survey weights. Estimators include ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables (2SLS), Newey
correction to the forbidden regression (NFI), the control function approach (CF), and 2-step to correct for
misreporting (2S). For comparison purposes, the first stage estimates for NFI and CF that we present are
obtained by calculating the marginal effects. The first stage estimates for 2S that we present are obtained




In this paper, we show that carefully considering functional form and accounting for misre-
porting may help explain the conflicting evidence across previous experimental and obser-
vational studies of the relationship between smoking and obesity. In particular, we show
that using a nonlinear first stage to estimate the relationship between cigarette taxes and
smoking status yields a negative relationship between smoking and BMI, which is consistent
with the experimental literature and some of the earlier literature using observational data.
Moreover, we show that accounting for misreporting and using a nonlinear first stage
with observational data yields estimates of similar sign and magnitude to this body of work.
For example, our preferred estimate suggests that quitting smoking increases BMI by 1.06
(about 7 pounds for someone 5’ 7” and 180 pounds), which is quite similar to the experimental
estimate of 2.2 (14 pounds) from Courtemanche et al. (2018), but quite different from the
estimated decrease in BMI of 4.2 to 5.7 (27 to 36 pounds) when following the approach of
Gruber and Frakes (2006) using 2SLS and observational data.
Using our estimation sample and incorporating survey weights, the proportion of smokers
declined from 25.4% in 2002 to 18.8% in 2017 while BMI rose from 26.7 to 27.9. Multiplying
the 6.6 percentage point decline in smoking by our preferred estimate of 1.06 yields a BMI
increase of 0.07, which explains roughly 6% of the overall BMI increase of 1.2 across the
same time period.
More broadly, our work shows how certain functional form choices and failing to account
for misreporting might result in biased estimates when using survey data and instrumental
variables methods. These considerations have receive little attention in the literature on
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the effects of smoking. As such, a key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how
researchers might effectively address them in future work.
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Chapter 3
Can Cigarette Taxes Still Reduce Teen Smoking?
3.1 Introduction
Cigarette smoking is the world’s leading cause of preventable death, killing an estimated six
million people per year (World Health Organization (2015)). In the U.S., despite large reduc-
tions in the smoking rate over the past several decades, smoking still leads to an estimated
480,000 deaths and $289 billion in costs from medical care and lost productivity. Public
policies on tobacco control include taxation, bans on smoking in public places, regulated
dispensation, criminalization, and informational campaigns, with taxation still being touted
as the most effective intervention in the public health community. Many tobacco control
efforts focus on teenagers, as 90% of adult smokers started before age 18 (US Department of
Health Human Services 2014). These efforts have largely been successful, as the percentage
of U.S. teens who smoke fell to 16% in 2013 from a high of 36% (see Figure 3.1).
An extensive literature has examined the relationship between cigarette excise taxes and
teen smoking1. Early studies relied on cross-sectional approaches and generally found that
higher taxes were associated with lower cigarette consumption (Baltagi and Goel (1987);
Chapman and Richardson (1990); Seldon and Boyd (1991); Peterson et al. (1992); Chaloupka
and Saffer (1992); Sung et al. (1994); Keeler et al. (1996)). Results from such studies may
not be causally interpretable, however, as states with stronger anti-smoking sentiments tend
to levy higher taxes and stronger sentiments discourage smoking directly2. Some researchers
1See Chaloupka and Warner (2000), Bader, Boisclair and Ferrence (2011), and Guindon (2013) for more
detailed reviews of the literature than we provide here.
2For instance, the average state-level cigarette excise tax rates in New York are more than eightfold of that
in North Carolina over the period 1991–2013 (Orzechowski Walker 2014). Surveys seeking to understand
individual perception of smoking (DeCicca et al. 2008) also find that anti-smoking sentiments are much
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Figure 3.1 Teen Smoking Rates and Weighted Average Cigarette Tax Rate
showed that the negative association persisted after controlling for proxies for state anti-
smoking sentiment, such as smoke-free air laws and tobacco control expenditures, but it is
difficult to capture all possible unobserved confounders in a cross-sectional design (Wasser-
man et al. (1991); Chaloupka and Saffer (1992); Chaloupka and Grossman (1996); Chaloupka
et al. (1996); Lewit et al. (1997); Chaloupka and Pacula (1998); Tauras and Chaloupka (1999);
Bardsley and Olekalns (1999)). More recent studies accounted for unobserved, time-invariant
state characteristics by estimating state fixed effects models. Using data from the National
Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), DeCicca et al. (2002) found little to no evidence of
an effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking initiation after including state fixed effects.
Carpenter and Cook (2008) (hereafter CC) also included state fixed effects but used data
stronger in New York than in North Carolina.
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from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS), which allows for a much larger sample size
spanning a longer period (1991 to 2005) than the NELS does3. They found that higher
taxes decreased youth smoking participation and frequent smoking, though the magnitude
of the effects were smaller than those found in the associational literature. Most recently,
Hansen et al. (2017) (hereinafter HSR) revisited CC’s findings by extending the sample pe-
riod to 20134. Using state fixed effects models, they documented a negative relationship
between cigarette taxes and youth smoking across the full sample period (1991-2013), but
found no evidence of an effect in the most recent years (2007-2013). This is an important
result, as it implies that further tax increases would not lead to further reductions in teen
smoking. Additionally, they showed that the effect in the full sample period disappears if
state-specific linear time trends are added. While including state trends helps account for
time-varying unobservables that are correlated with tax changes and youth smoking, it does
so at the cost of discarding potentially useful identifying variation in taxes. Accordingly,
HSR are agnostic as to which model is preferable. The goal of our paper is to shed light on
two important unresolved questions from HSR’s work. First, why has the effect of cigarette
taxes on youth smoking disappeared in recent years? We argue that the diminished tax
effect can be attributed to an inherently nonlinear relationship5. Price-sensitive youth are
the most likely to be responsive initially as the cigarette tax begins to rise. After decades of
tax increases, price-sensitive youth may have already been driven from the market, leaving
only price-insensitive youth who are not responsive to continued increases. The result is
3CC use micro-level data from the national YRBS as well as aggregate-level data from the state and local
YRBS.
4Unlike CC, HSR use the micro-level data from both the national and state YRBS, which is the same
data source we will employ.
5HSR mention this possibility in their conclusion.
61
a non-linear relationship between cigarette tax rate and youth smoking, with the marginal
effect being strongest at low levels of taxation. The average baseline tax rate in 2007 may
have been high enough to be in the flat portion of the curve, leading to HSR’s finding of
a null effect during the 2007-2013 period. We provide two pieces of evidence to support
this proposition. First, we estimate the relationship between cigarette tax rate and youth
smoking semi-parametrically using Yatchew’s difference estimator. This allows the data to
choose the appropriate functional form, conditional on state and year fixed effects as well
as observable characteristics. The results indeed document a diminishing marginal effect
of cigarette taxes on youth smoking, with the average 2007 tax rate lying in the relatively
flat portion of the curve. This finding is robust to the use of parametric non-linear models
such as a quadratic specification in taxes. Second, our hypothesis implies that tax increases
should still effectively deter youth smoking in states with low baseline tax rates, since they
are not yet on the flat of the curve. Consistent with this prediction, we show that higher
taxes lead to statistically significant and economically meaningful reductions in teen smoking
in 2007-2013 in states with low 2007 tax rates. In other words, raising cigarette taxes can
still reduce teen smoking in some states, even if there is little to no effect across the country
on average. The second unresolved question from HSR is whether, in light of the sensitivity
of the full-sample-period results to the inclusion of state-specific time trends, there has ever
actually been a true, causal effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking in the first place. In-
terestingly, we find that the results using non-linear modeling approaches actually are robust
to the inclusion of state trends. This means that conclusions on the relationship between
cigarette taxes and youth smoking can be reached even without resolving the methodological
debate about whether models with or without state trends are more appropriate.
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3.2 Data
Following HSR, we use data from the national and state YRBS, spanning 1991 to 2013. The
YRBS is one of the leading data sources on youth risky behaviors. Started in 1991, the
YRBS has surveyed thousands of high school students around the country and has been im-
plemented every other year. The national YRBS is conducted by Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and the state YRBS, while coordinated by CDC, is usually adminis-
tered by the participating state health departments or education agencies6. The advantage
of pooling the national and state YRBS is sample size, as this leads to about six times more
observations than the national YRBS alone. The YRBS’ smoking question is, “During the
past 30 days, on how many days did you smoke cigarettes?” Following CDC’s benchmark,
we define youth as current smokers if any day of smoking is reported and as frequent smokers
if cigarettes are used more than 20 days over the past month. Our cigarette tax variable
is the combined state and federal excise tax rate in effect at the end of March of each sur-
vey year. The prior literature generally includes only state tax rates since tax changes at
the federal level are common to all states and thus absorbed by the time effects. We also
include federal taxes because of our focus on nonlinearities: starting place along the distribu-
tion matters for the predicted marginal effect, and federal tax rate matters for the starting
place. Our use of the tax rate from March, which follows CC and HSR, is done because
6Many states have authorized CDC to distribute their data for secondary analyses and for states that
have not, we received their permissions to use the data. In addition, we have obtained permission from CDC
to use state identifiers in the national YRBS dataset. The states included in both the national and state
YRBS vary somewhat each year, though our inclusion of state fixed effects should mitigate any resulting bias
in the econometric estimates. See HSR for state-by-year observation counts; our sample is nearly identical
to theirs.
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the YRBS does not provide survey dates and most states administer YRBS in the spring
when school is in session. Finally, we convert the nominal tax rate to 2013 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI–U). We control for individual char-
acteristics and state-level policies that could correlate with changes in both cigarette taxes
and youth smoking. The individual-level controls are age in years as well as dummy vari-
ables for gender (female), race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white (base category), non-Hispanic
black, Hispanic, and other races), and grade level (9th grade (base category), 10th, 11th,
and 12th). The first state-level control is an indicator variable for the comprehensiveness of
smoke-free air laws, set equal to one if smoking is banned in government and private work-
sites, restaurants, and bars, and 0 otherwise. This information comes from the CDC STATE
system. The other state-level variables are unemployment rates in March and the natural
logarithm of per capita personal income, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the variables
discussed above for CC’s sample period of 1991-2005 and HSR’s other sample periods of
1991-2013 and 2007-2013. From 1991-2005 to 2007-2013, youth smoking prevalence declined
from 27% to 16% while cigarette taxes and the prevalence of comprehensive smoke-free air
laws increased substantially. The demographic characteristics stayed relatively steady over
time, aside from a modest shift in the racial/ethnic makeup of the population from non-
Hispanic white to Hispanic and other groups. We also observe a higher unemployment rate
in the later sample period, which corresponds with the Great Recession and gradual recovery.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
1991-2005 2007-2013 1991-2013
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Current smoker 0.27 0.44 0.16 0.36 0.21 0.41
Frequent smoker 0.13 0.33 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29
Female 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50
Age 16.0 1.21 16.0 1.23 16.0 1.22
Non-Hispanic white 0.64 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.49
Non-Hispanic black 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Hispanic 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35
Others 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.32
9th grade 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
10th grade 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
11th grade 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
12th grade 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Cigarette excise taxes (2013 $) 0.80 0.48 2.29 1.10 1.54 1.13
Comprehensive smoke-free air law 0.03 0.18 0.47 0.50 0.25 0.44
State unemployment rates 5.12 1.31 6.98 2.03 6.05 1.95
State per capita personal income 10.19 0.25 10.64 0.17 10.41 0.31
Observations 535,135 537,320 1,072,455
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) are reported. We define youth as a current smoker if
any day of smoking is reported. We define youth as a frequent smoker if she smoked cigarettes in 20 or more
days over the past month. Cigarette excise taxes include federal and state tax rates, effective in March of
a given survey year. Cigarette tax data come from The Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker
2014). We inflation adjust cigarette tax rates to 2013 dollars using CPI-U. Comprehensive smoke-free air
law is an indicator variable set equal to one if smoking is restricted in government and private work places,
restaurants, and bars, effective in February of a given survey year. Data come from CDC STATE System.
State unemployment rates, in February of a given survey year, come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Per capita income comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Reported in natural log).
3.3 Replication
We begin our empirical analysis by showing that we can replicate CC’s and HSR’s results
with our data. Following their approaches, we estimate the average marginal effects of
cigarette taxes on youth smoking by running logistic regressions of the form
Y ∗ist = βCigTaxst + X
′γ + ws + vt + εist (3.1)
Y ∗ist is a latent variable reflecting the smoking frequency of youth i in state s in year t. We
do not observe Y ∗, but instead observe the dichotomous variables for current and frequent
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smoking. The vector X contains the aforementioned individual- and state-level controls.
State fixed effects, which account for time-invariant state-specific unobserved heterogeneity,
and year fixed effects, which capture any macro-level shocks common to all states, are denoted
by ws and vt, respectively. By convention, we cluster standard errors at the state level
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004, Cameron and Miller 2015). Table 3.2 reports the
resulting average marginal effects of cigarette taxes on youth current and frequent smoking,
alongside estimates from CC and HSR. The first three columns use CC’s sample period of
1991-2005, the next two use HSR’s full sample period of 1991-2013, and the final two use
HSR’s other sample period of interest: 2007-2013. As in HSR, we present results from the
state, national, and combined state and national versions of the YRBS. The main takeaway
from Table 3.2 is that we are able to replicate the results of CC and HSR fairly closely
despite small differences in sample sizes. Using data from the national YRBS between 1991
and 2005, CC find that a dollar increase in the state cigarette excise tax is associated with
a 5.9 percentage point (pp) decrease in youth smoking participation and a 4.1 pp decrease
in frequent smoking. Using the same dataset, our calculation suggests that a one-dollar
increase in the tax rate reduces youth smoking participation by 4.4 pp and frequent smoking
by 2.6 pp. The magnitudes of the tax effects are slightly smaller in the dataset we use, but
they are quite close to those of HSR (4.6 pp and 2.6 pp respectively)7. We also confirm
HSR’s result that the effects shrink roughly in half after adding data from the 2007-2013
waves and become statistically insignificant if the sample is restricted to just the 2007-2013
period. Also similarly to HSR, we find that the results remain qualitatively unchanged if we
7One reason that our estimates, as well as those of HSR, are smaller than those reported by CC is that
CC calculated the “marginal” change in smoking rates resulting from a $1 change in cigarette tax using the
linear projection function after running the logistic regression. We, and HSR, instead calculate the average
marginal effects.
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use the state or combined state and national versions of the YRBS as opposed to just the
national version. Since the estimates are the most precise in the combined dataset, we will
use that for the remainder of our analyses.
Table 3.3 presents the results for the combined dataset after adding state-specific linear
time trends, alongside the corresponding estimates from HSR. Again, consistent with their
results, cigarette tax is no longer statistically significantly associated with youth smoking
once state trends are included, even during the period (1991-2005) over which taxes exhibit
a strongly deterrent effect without the state trends. This could indicate that the observed
relationship between cigarette taxes and youth smoking is attributable to time-varying state
unobservables rather than a genuine causal effect. Alternatively, the state trends could be
eliminating useful variation. After including them, only 5% of the variation in cigarette tax
remains, and the effect of that small portion of the variation could conceivably be different
from the genuine causal effect of the remaining, discarded variation. Researchers have de-
bated the appropriateness of controlling for state trends in the cigarette taxation literature.
See, for instance, the dialogue between Gruber and Frakes (2006) and Chou, Grossman, and
Saffer (2006). We therefore take an agnostic view about which model is more appropriate
and will show that, fortunately, the distinction will not ultimately matter after better ac-
counting for nonlinearities.
3.4 Semi-parametric Analyses
In this section, we employ Yatchew’s difference estimator to trace out the impacts of cigarette














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: State-Specific Time Trends
HSR Current HSR Current HSR Current
Paper Paper Paper
Current Smoker -0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Frequent Smoker -0.008 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
N 512,793 535,135 1,042,296 1,072,455 529,503 537,320
Time Span 1991–2005 1991–2005 1991–2013 1991–2013 2007–2013 2007–2013
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels,
and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural
logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects. CC=Carpenter and Cook (2008),
HSR=Hansen, Sabia, and Rees (2017). Survey weights applied when the analysis sample uses data solely
from the national YRBS.
appropriate functional form (Yatchew 2003, 1997). The model becomes
Yist = βf(CigTaxst) + X
′γ + ws + vt + εist (3.2)
where the key change is the flexible functional form for cigarette tax8. By construction,
f(.) is a smooth, single-valued function with bounded first-order derivatives. Yatchew’s
difference estimator is partially linear; therefore, ′γ, f(CigTaxs,t), and the error term
εist
are additively separable. A detailed explanation of the method is outside the scope of this
paper but its logic can be summarized as follows. For ease of exposition, let f(TL) denote
f(CigTaxs,t).
8Another change is that the discrete nature of the outcome variable is no longer formally modeled. To
verify that this alone is inconsequential, Appendix Table A.1 reports the results using a linear probability
model rather than logit. The estimates are very similar to the corresponding marginal effects from Table
3.1.
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To begin with, the estimator arranges data in the order of Tax1 < Tax2 << Taxj, where
j indicates the total number of observations in the estimation sample. The specification in
(2) is then estimated in the form of “first-order” differences:yI − yI−1 = βf(TL − TL−1) +′













where m denotes the order differencing and d0, d1, . . . , dm are the differencing coefficients
that satisfy a pre-imposed condition:∑m





Since TL (cigarette excise tax) has a compact support,
∑m
n=1 dnf(TL−n) shrinks and is
removed as the sample size increases. The parameter γ is estimated using OLS regression
and the function f is derived by regressing (yI −X′γ̂dif ) onTL non-parametrically, analogous
to a stylized locally weighted regression. The differencing order m affects the estimator’s
asymptotic efficiency and Monte Carlo simulations report noticeable efficiency gains from
higher-order differencing (Lokshin 2006)9. In the following analyses, we set m equal to 7 be-
cause higher order differencing (8th-10th) is no longer associated with efficiency gains, only
additional computational intensity. The upper panel of Figure 3.2 presents the smoothed tax
effects f(TL) on youth current smoking while the bottom panel shows the effects on youth
frequent smoking, both with data from the combined national and state YRBS, spanning
1991–2013. The figures on the left show the results without the state trends, while those on
the right include them. It is apparent that the deterrent effect of cigarette tax on smoking
910th order differencing is the upper bound imposed by Yatchew’s difference estimator.
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Figure 3.2 Semi-Parametric Estimates: Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking
is not constant but diminishing over the tax range. This pattern is particularly pronounced
when we account for the state-specific time trends, as the predicted rates of both current
and frequent smoking are essentially flat at tax rates of higher than $3.
Figure 3.3 depicts the same results in a different manner by plotting how the marginal
effects, rather than the predicted smoking rates, change across the tax distribution. In all
four graphs (both outcomes, with and without state trends), the marginal effect of taxes on
youth smoking is negative and significant at low levels of taxation, but eventually becomes
insignificant. The effects on current and frequent smoking turn insignificant at tax rates of
approximately $2 per pack without state trends, compared to less than $1 once state trends
are added. In three of the four graphs, the effects actually turn positive and significant at
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Figure 3.3 Average Marginal Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking
the highest tax rates, though we caution against a literal interpretation of that result since
it is based on very few state-year combinations.
3.5 Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
The results from Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are consistent with the hypothesis that the disappear-
ance of an effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking is due to an inherently nonlinear rela-
tionship: steadily rising tax rates over several decades have driven price-sensitive consumers
from the market, leaving only those who are price-insensitive continuing to smoke. This
section conducts a variety of robustness checks in an effort to rule out possible alternative
explanations.
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Figure 3.4 Semi-Parametric Estimates: Cigarette Prices and Youth Smoking
Cigarette Prices Instead of Taxes
First, our hypothesis relates to consumer responses to cigarette prices, but our analyses
thus far focus on taxes. A diminishing marginal effect of taxes does not necessarily imply a
diminishing marginal effect of prices. For instance, if tax increases did not pass through as
fully to prices in recent years, we might observe a diminishing effect of taxes but linear effect
of prices. Figure 3.4 therefore presents results for a semi-parametric analysis identical to
that in equation (3) but replacing tax rates with (tax-inclusive) per-pack prices. The shapes
of all four graphs are similar to those from Figure 3.2, with a diminishing marginal effect




Another possible concern is that the observed pattern of nonlinearity might be an artifact of
the particular functional form chosen by the Yatchew semi-parametric method. It is therefore
useful to check if a similar pattern emerges using a simpler parametric nonlinear specification.
Table 3.4 therefore reports results from a model including both cigarette tax and its square
(i.e. quadratic in cigarette tax). Given the difficulty of interpreting nonlinear models with
interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003), we employ a linear probability model (LPM) rather
than a logit. We therefore also present results for a LPM without the squared term in order
to verify that they are similar to the average marginal effects from the logistic regressions
reported previously10. The results from the quadratic specifications, for both outcomes and
regardless of whether state trends are included, are consistent with those from the semi-
parametric model. In all four cases, the coefficient estimate for cigarette tax is negative and
significant while that for its square is positive and significant. This indicates a negative effect
at low levels of taxation that gradually diminishes and eventually turns positive. Without
state trends, the marginal effect turns positive at a tax rate of $3.50 for current smoker and
$2.67 for frequent smoker, respectively. In the semiparametric results shown in Figure 3.3,
the corresponding marginal effects both cross zero at around $3.20. With state trends, the
marginal effects from the quadratic specification in Table 3.4 become positive at just $0.85
and $0.87 for current and frequent smoker, respectively. In the semiparametric models from
10Specifically, since the regressions in Table 3.4 all use the combined sample from 1991-2013, the -0.012
estimate for current smoker from the first column should be compared to the -0.011 estimate from the
combined sample/1991-2013/current paper/current smoker cell in Table 3.2, while the -0.010 estimate for
frequent smoker should be compared to the -0.007 estimate from the combined sample/1991-2013/current
paper/frequent smoker cell in Table 3.2. Similarly, the estimates including state trends from the third column
of Table 3.4 – 0.004 and 0.001, respectively – parallel the estimates of 0.002 and 0.000 from the fourth column
of Table 3.3. Appendix Table A.1 reports results from linear probability models using other samples and
time periods.
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Figure 3.3, the marginal effects with state trends cross zero at somewhat higher rates of
about $2.20 and $2.60. Nonetheless, the fact that the general shapes of the curves are the
same is reassuring.
Table 3.4 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: Quadratic Specification
Linear Quadratic Linear With Quadratic With
State Trends State Trends
Youth is a Current Smoker
Cigarette Tax -0.012* -0.021*** 0.004 -0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Cigarette Tax Squared 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Youth is a Frequent Smoker
Cigarette Tax -0.010** -0.016*** 0.001 -0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cigarette Tax Squared 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,072,455 1,072,455 1,072,455 1,072,455
Notes: Results are from linear probability models estimated using the combined state and national YBRS
sample from 1991-2013. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity,
grade levels, and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates,
and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects
Appendix Table A.2 further reports results from cubic, quartic, and quintic specifications,
while Appendix Table A.3 does the same adding linear state-specific time trends. The
higher-order polynomial terms are always insignificant, meaning that there is little additional
information to be learned from parametric models beyond quadratic. Another issue related
to functional form is whether the observed diminishing marginal effect of cigarette taxes on
youth smoking could simply reflect a constant elasticity. If every 100% increase in the tax
rate leads to the same percentage change in smoking, this would still show up as a diminishing
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marginal effect when the regression is run in levels11. Elasticities can be estimated using a
log-log functional form, but that is not feasible with the individual-level YRBS data because
of the dichotomous nature of the outcomes. We therefore aggregate the data to the state-by-
year level and re-estimate regression equation (1) as a LPM with the natural logarithm of the
percentage of youth who are current (or frequent) smokers as the dependent variable and the
natural logarithm of the tax rate as the independent variable. The coefficient from this new
specification can be interpreted as the (approximate) tax elasticity of cigarette consumption.
We weight each observation by the number of individuals in the state-by-year cell to preserve
comparability to individual-level estimates (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2007). The results in
Table 3.5 show that the cigarette tax elasticity did change over time. Specifically, the tax
elasticities from 1991-2005 are 17% for current smoking and 31% for frequent smoking. The
elasticities shrink roughly in half after incorporating survey waves through 2013, and they
turn positive but small and insignificant in 2007-2013 alone. This is essentially the same
pattern observed in our main estimates from Table 3.2.
E-Cigarettes
E-cigarettes, whose popularity among teens rose sharply during the years added to the sam-
ple by HSR, are a possible confounding factor. Is it possible that the availability of this
new nicotine delivery system accounts for the reduced tax elasticity observed above? The-
11To illustrate, suppose an increase in the tax rate from $0.50 to $1 reduces the smoking rate from 20% to
17%. This would mean a 100% increase in tax reduces smoking by 15%, for an elasticity of 0.15. At the same
elasticity, an additional 100% increase in taxes to $2 would only decrease the smoking rate to 14.45%. Since
we achieve a smaller decrease in smoking rates out of a larger increase in tax rates (in levels), it follows that
for an equivalent increase in cigarette taxes ($0.5), we would have seen an even smaller decrease in smoking
rates. Therefore, when estimated in levels, this constant elasticity would show up as a diminishing marginal
effect, as the increase in taxes at higher values will always be a larger dollar amount than the increase in
taxes at lower values, with the resulting percentage point change in the smoking rate being smaller.
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Table 3.5 Cigarette Tax Elasticities using Aggregated State-Level Data
1991-2005 2007-2013 1991-2013
Panel A: ln(% Current Smokers)
ln(Cigarette Tax) -0.172** 0.077 -0.088*
(0.069) (0.088) (0.044)
Panel B: ln(% Frequent Smokers)
ln(Cigarette Tax) -0.313*** 0.079 -0.153**
(0.098) (0.131) (0.064)
N 299 188 487
Notes: Results are from linear probability models using the combined state and national YRBS sample.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age),
state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm
of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the state/year
cell size.
oretically, this seems unlikely, as the availability of a new substitute should, if anything,
increase consumers’ price responsiveness in the traditional cigarette market12. To further
rule out this concern, we next conduct an analysis of the effect of cigarette taxes on youth
e-cigarette use. Since the YRBS did not include e-cigarette questions during our study pe-
riod, we instead use data from the National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS), which included
such questions from 2011-2013. During this period, the percentage of youth who report
ever using e-cigarettes rose from 3% to 8%, while the percentage reporting current use (past
30 days) rose from 1% to 3%. Therefore, while we are not able to study e-cigarettes until
2011, the very low rate of use as of 2011 suggests that it is unlikely that there was any
meaningful effect of cigarette taxes on e-cigarette use prior to then. Table 3.6 reports the
results from logistic regressions of the same form as equation (1) but with ever using and
12There is debate in the literature about whether cigarettes and e-cigarettes are actually substitutes.
Conceivably, they could be complements if e-cigarettes serve as a gateway to subsequent traditional smoking.
Available evidence from quasi-experimental studies of the impact of e-cigarette regulations on youth smoking
seems to suggest that, if anything, the two products are substitutes (Friedman 2015, Pesko, Hughes, and
Faisal 2016, Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2017). Moreover, even if they were complements, subsequent transition
to traditional cigarettes might occur after the respondents leave high school, in which case they would be
outside of our sample age range.
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currently using e-cigarettes as the outcomes. The coefficient estimate for cigarette tax is
small and statistically significant in both cases. These results suggest that our finding of a
diminishing marginal effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking is unlikely to be attributable
to the introduction of e-cigarettes toward the end of our sample period.
Table 3.6 Cigarette Taxes and Youth E-Cigarette Use








Notes: Results are from logistic regressions using the National Youth Tobacco Survey: 2011-2013. Standard
errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parenthesis. Average marginal effects reported. Sampling
weights are applied. All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity,
grade levels, and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates,
and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects.
3.6 Average Effects in States with Low Baseline Tax Rates
The results thus far provide, in our view, compelling evidence of fundamental nonlinear-
ity in youths’ responses to rising cigarette taxes, with effects being relatively strong at low
baseline levels of taxation and small or zero at higher levels. This nonlinearity provides an
explanation for the disappearance of an average effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking
in the 2007-2013 sample period. However, it also implies that youths in states with low tax
rates at the start of this period may still have been responsive to tax increases, as their
states were not yet on the “flat of the curve”. In other words, price-sensitive consumers had
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not yet been driven out of the market in these states. To directly test this hypothesis, we
re-estimate equation (1) for the 2007-2013 sample period, stratifying into three groups based
on baseline (2007) state tax rates13. The first group consists of 13 states with baseline state
taxes rates of no more than $0.50 per pack. These states are AL, GA, FL, IA, KY, LA,
MS, MO, NC, ND, SC, TN, and VA. Between 2007 and 2013, six of these states (FL, KY,
MS, NC, SC, TN) raised cigarette taxes at least once, with Florida implementing the largest
increase, from $0.39 to $1.39 per pack. The middle group consists of 25 states with baseline
state tax rates between $0.50 and $1.50, while the high tax group contains 13 states with tax
rates over $1.50. Table 3.7 presents the results, both with and without state-specific linear
time trends. Among these 13 states with low 2007 tax rates, taxes are indeed negatively
and significantly associated with youth smoking during the 2007-2013 period. A one-dollar
increase reduces current and frequent smoking by 0.9 and 1 pp, respectively, in the regres-
sions without state trends and 2.3 and 2.5 pp in the regressions with them. The latter are
similar to the magnitudes from the 1991-2005 period during which baseline (1991) tax rates
in most states were low and, accordingly, CC, HSR, and the current study found statistically
significant average effects across the whole country14. In contrast, the effects in the middle
and high tax groups are all small and statistically insignificant. Since the vast majority of
the population lives in the middle and high tax states as opposed to the low tax states, the
null average effect during 2007-2013 pooling all states together is not surprising.
13Since the number of states in each stratified sample is relatively small, we use bootstrapped standard
errors instead of clustering standard errors by state (Courtemanche and Zapata 2014).
14Appendix Table A.4 explores adding higher order polynomials and finds that quadratic, cubic, quartic,
and quintic terms are all insignificant. This suggests that the cigarette tax effect is approximately linear
for low-baseline-tax states, consistent with the tax increases occurring in the left portion of the curves from
Figure 3.2, before the diminishing marginal effects become particularly evident.
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Table 3.7 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: States Grouped by Tax
Low Tax Low Tax; Med Tax Med Tax; High Tax High Tax;
State Trends State Trends State Trends
Current Smoker -0.009** -0.023** 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
[0.004] [0.011] [0.007] [0.012] [0.009] [0.014]
Frequent Smoker -0.010** -0.025** 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.002
[0.004] [0.009] [0.003] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 114,078 114,078 275,070 275,070 148,172 148,172
Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample. Bootstrapped standard
errors are shown in square brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions control
for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels, and age), state-level covariates
(comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural logarithm of per capita personal
income), and state and year fixed effects. States included in the low tax group are AL, GA, FL, KY, IA, LA,
MS, MO, NC, ND, SC, TN, and VA. States included in the medium tax group are AR, CA, CO, DC, DE,
ID, IL, IN, KS, MD, MN, NE, NV, NH, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, TN, UT, WV, WI, and WY. States
included in the high tax group are AK, AZ, CT, HI, ME, MA, MI, MT, NJ, RI, SD, VT, and WA.
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3.7 Conclusion
A recent study by HSR finds that the deterrent effect of cigarette excise taxes on youth
smoking documented by CC and others has disappeared in recent years, raising questions
about their continued effectiveness in achieving public health objectives. In this paper,
we provide evidence from semi-parametric and parametric models that this phenomenon is
attributable to a fundamentally nonlinear relationship. Tax increases are effective in reducing
youth smoking up to a point, but once tax rates are sufficiently high that price sensitive
consumers have already left the market, further tax increases are ineffective (other than as
a revenue source). During the 1991-2005 period examined by CC, initial tax rates were
sufficiently low that subsequent increases did reduce youth smoking. In contrast, during the
2007-2013 period added by HSR, baseline tax rates in most states were sufficiently high that
additional increases did not prove to be effective deterrents on average. However, in states
that still had low taxes in 2007, tax increases in subsequent years did indeed reduce smoking.
In other words, the disappearance of the average effect is simply due to the extensive nature
of prior tax increases, as opposed to, for instance, an underlying change in consumer demand.
Interestingly, our conclusions are not sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific linear time
trends, which contrasts the sensitivity observed by HSR in regressions with a more restrictive
functional form. Our findings have implications for cigarette tax policy moving forward. In
principle, our results suggest that further tax increases would be effective in reducing youth
smoking in states that still have low tax rates. For how many states might this be the case?
The point estimates from our semi-parametric regressions imply that the “flat of the curve”
begins at a tax rate of no less than $2.20 or greater (Figure 3.3, upper right graph). As of
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this writing, sixteen states still had combined state and federal tax rates of under $2.20. The
somewhat sizeable confidence intervals around our semi-parametric estimates mean that this
is only a rough estimate, but there are likely at least some states that have not yet reached
the flat of the curve. In other words, cigarette taxation can still be an effective tool to curb




Table A1 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: Linear Probability Models
1991-2005 1991-2013 2007-2013
State YRBS
Current Smoker -0.027*** -0.011** 0.006
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Frequent Smoker -0.023*** -0.006 0.004
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
N 431,298 913,239 481,941
National YRBS
Current Smoker -0.036** -0.022** -0.012
(0.018) (0.010) (0.023)
Frequent Smoker -0.025* -0.010* -0.008
(0.014) (0.006) (0.018)
N 103,837 159,216 55,318
Combined State and National YRBS
Current Smoker -0.022*** -0.012* 0.008*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Frequent Smoker -0.017*** -0.010** 0.006**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
N 535,135 1,072,455 537,320
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels,
and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural
logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects. CC=Carpenter and Cook (2008),
HSR=Hansen, Sabia, and Rees (2017). Survey weights applied when the analysis sample uses data solely
from the national YRBS.
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Table A2 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: Different Functional Forms
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Youth is a current smoker
CigaretteTaxes -0.012* -0.021*** -0.007 -0.033 -0.029
0.006 0.006 0.015 0.042 0.085
CigaretteTaxes2 0.003*** -0.003 0.019 0.013
0.001 0.007 0.032 0.090






Panel B: Youth is a frequent smoker
CigaretteTaxes -0.010** -0.016*** -0.011 −0.065+ -0.093
0.004 0.005 0.010 0.036 0.083
CigaretteTaxes2 0.003*** -0.000 0.044 0.078
0.001 0.005 0.028 0.088






Observations (Col 1-5) 1,072,455
Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample and linear probability
models. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01 All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels,
and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural
logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects.
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Table A3 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: Additional Functional Forms
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Youth is a current smoker
CigaretteTaxes 0.004 -0.017** -0.023 -0.038 -0.209
(0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.063) (0.144)
CigaretteTaxes2 0.004*** 0.006 0.018 0.213
(0.001) (0.010) (0.047) (0.147)






Panel B: Youth is a frequent smoker
CigaretteTaxes 0.001 -0.013*** -0.027* -0.039 -0.111
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.037) (0.091)
CigaretteTaxes2 0.003*** 0.009 0.019 0.101
(0.001) (0.006) (0.027) (0.093)






Observations (Col 1-5) 1,072,455
Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample and linear probability
models. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01 All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, grade levels,
and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates, and natural
logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects.
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Table A4 Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: Combined YRBS
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Youth is a current smoker
CigaretteTaxes -0.015** -0.012 -0.153 0.425 1.509
(0.006) (0.045) (0.128) (0.520) (0.870)
CigaretteTaxes2 -0.001 0.136 -0.692 -2.901
(0.015) (0.122) (0.751) (1.722)






Panel B: Youth is a frequent smoker
CigaretteTaxes -0.008* 0.010 -0.102 0.287 -0.645
(0.004) (0.022) (0.078) (0.297) (0.633)
CigaretteTaxes2 -0.006 0.103 -0.454 1.446
(0.007) (0.075) (0.415) (1.211)






Observations 114,078 114,078 114,078 114,078 114,078
Notes: Results are estimated using the combined state and national YBRS sample and linear probability
models. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at the state level, are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions control for youth demographic characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity,
grade levels, and age), state-level covariates (comprehensive smoke-free air laws, state unemployment rates,
and natural logarithm of per capita personal income), and state and year fixed effects.
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